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Preface
This study of space deterrence was produced over the course of a year by the staff of the
Eisenhower Center, benefiting from the comments of individuals from all sectors of the space
community. We want especially to thank Col. Patrick Frakes for the material and intellectual
support that made the study possible.
The political atmosphere of space policy is dynamic, and any study like ours must
represent our best judgment at a moment in time. Were we to revise our judgments in light of
events since this study took on final form, we might well put less emphasis on economic
entanglement as a factor in deterring attacks on U.S. space assets. The economic crisis of 20082009 can be seen as a test of the depth of that entanglement. The economic distress has been
widespread and has demonstrated the mutual dependence of large economies in a globalized
world. But some countries have weathered the downturn much better than others. In particular,
the Chinese economy seems to have bounced rapidly back in spite of a substantial fall off of
demand from the United States, perhaps because of the cushion of two trillion dollars in reserves
built up over the previous decade. This would indicate that damage to the international financial
system created by interruptions of space services might well have greater impact on the United
States than on some possible space competitors, and consequently that the deterrent effect of
globalization on hostilities in space, instead impacting all space faring nations equally as our
study implies, might be more keenly felt in the United States. The moral seems to be that
prudent financial management – or its lack – will always affect national power, in space no less
than elsewhere.
Readers will doubtless find other areas in which our judgments might be challenged, as
some of the commentators we include in this follow certainly did. Our conviction was and
remains that no discussion of a topic like space deterrence can begin until someone throws the
gauntlet. That we have tried to do here, stating our conclusions as forcefully as we can in the
hope that this approach will stimulate thinking by others and prove useful to policy makers.

Roger G. Harrison, Ph.D.
Allan & Malcolm Lockheed and Glenn L. Martin Professor
Director, Eisenhower Center for Space & Defense Studies

Space Deterrence: The Delicate Balance of Risk
Roger G. Harrison, Deron R. Jackson, and Collins G. Shackelford
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies

Executive Summary
The United States has created a military
structure that is heavily satellite-dependent,
without making corresponding improvements
in the survivability of its space systems. The
result is a classic opportunity for asymmetric,
preemptive attack. The central question of
this study is how to structure a strategy of
deterrence to persuade potentially hostile
actors that the costs of attack will nevertheless
outweigh the benefits.
There is little to be gained from attacks in
space unless they translate into strategic or
tactical advantage within the atmosphere.
Space and terrestrial deterrence are therefore
inextricably linked. If space deterrence is not
credible – i.e. if an aggressor perceives that he
can critically disable U.S. air, ground and sea
forces by a preemptive attack in space –
terrestrial deterrence is weakened. If, on the
other hand, he perceives that a preemptive
attack in space will not yield a decisive
tactical or strategic advantage, both space and
terrestrial deterrence are strengthened.
Although the body of strategic analysis that
structured Cold War deterrence provides a
This study was conducted by the Eisenhower Center for
Space and Defense Studies of the United States Air Force
Academy. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations
expressed or implied in this report are those of its authors, and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Air Force
Academy, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, nor any
other agency of the United States Government. For questions
or comments about this study, address correspondence to the
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, HQ
USAFA/DFPS, 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 6L16, United
States Air Force Academy, Colorado 80840, (719) 333-1745
(telephone), Roger.Harrison@usafa.edu (e-mail).

foundation as well for a study of deterrence in
space, factors unique to space make the
conclusions reached in that earlier era
suggestive rather than determinative. Among
those unique factors are some that make the
task of deterrence in space less difficult than
nuclear deterrence, others that complicate it.
For example, Cold War deterrence assumed a
rough equality of capability and risk between
the superpowers.
The same assumption
cannot be made in space. The U.S. is
uniquely capable there, but also uniquely
vulnerable. The threat of retaliation was the
centerpiece of Cold War deterrence. It is
more problematic in space because, among
other things, of difficulty of attribution of
attack. There was scope in the Cold War for
exploitation of various defensive strategies,
including hardening, mobility and eventually
ballistic missile defense. Defensive options
also exist in space, but are more limited and
may compromise capability. On the other
hand, a failure of deterrence in space, although
it
would
have
profound
military
consequences, is not an existential threat to
the United States. There is no space analogue
to the Cold War policy of mutual assured
destruction.
The most effective space deterrence posture is
therefore one that draws on the strengths of
several forms of deterrence while avoiding the
weakness (in the space environment) of each
in isolation. Thus, a space deterrence posture
is stronger which confronts an adversary with
the early imposition of unacceptable political
and economic costs, presents a credible threat
of certain retaliation, and ultimately persuades
him that he will be denied the benefit of
attack. A deterrence posture is stronger when
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it forces an adversary to compete across a
range of capabilities – air, sea, land, undersea,
cyber and space – than when it allows him a
decisive advantage by competing successfully
in area of operations, i.e. space. Politically, a
deterrence posture is stronger if it is credible
to adversaries and enhances consensus
building among allies. It is stronger if, in
crisis, it satisfies the requirements of the
military leadership for decisiveness, and the
demand of political leaders for flexibility.
Deterrence will seldom be optimized in all
these variables. Trade-offs – the balance of
risk we use as our title – will be necessary.
For example, decision makers may be willing
to accept stronger international norms in
space, and the resulting restrictions on U.S.
freedom of action, if the alternative is an antisatellite (ASAT) arms race in space.
International norms, including arms control,
are inherently difficult to verify in space, and
perhaps impossible to verify in the case of
ground-based electromagnetic weapons of the
sort most likely to be used in future to negate
U.S. space capability. Moreover, the prudent
assumption would be that an adversary will
attempt to negate space services just at those
times and on those fields of battle where they
are most necessary. Accordingly, a robust
strategy of deterrence by denial will require a
credible U.S. strategy to “fight through” any
attempt to deny space services to its forces.
This means multiplying the sources of those
services both in space and within the
atmosphere, and considering in advance what
to do if the screen goes blank.
Even the strongest deterrence strategy is not a
guarantee against attack. Still, a deterrence
posture based on strengthened military
capabilities and broadened international
engagement should provide a greater measure
of security and stability in space, even as the
entry of new space-faring powers like the
PRC, and the reemergence as a possible

military competitor of the Russian Federation,
raise the specter of space as a “contested”
environment. A layered deterrence framework
offers the prospect of responding to changes in
the dynamic space security environment
including a perceived “vulnerability gap,” the
growing number of space powers, and the
potentially contested nature of space.
We have set a time horizon of twenty years,
about the span necessary to develop and
deploy two generations of satellites, i.e.
sufficient time for the full range of potential
threats to develop, and for the United States to
respond with changes to the design and
deployment of potential offensive and/or
defensive counter measures. Our intent is not
to create consensus, but to spark debate.
Finally, this study is not a threat analysis.
Threat is assumed here for purposes of
argument.
Whether in fact our satellite
capabilities face a threat sufficient to justify
adoption of the measures recommended here
is the subject for a different study, and
decision for national security decision makers.
Section I: Introduction and Terms of
Reference
Deterrence in general is a process by which
decision makers of a hostile entity are
persuaded that the costs of attacking a U.S.
asset or interest will outweigh the benefits.
They may be persuaded by the likely effects
of an attack on other national interests, the
certainty of the threat of retaliation, or by
uncertainty of ultimate success.1
1

Deterrence requires that an adversary accept the
inevitability of a string of consequences arising from
his initial attack – i.e. that he envision (in the same way
we do) the likely situation at D+1, D+2 and so on, with
D as the circumstance just before the initial attack.
Rationally, we realize that the situation at D arises from
a host of variables, some known, some unknown, some
within our control and some not. We arbitrarily
designate a subset of these variables as determinative

Space and Defense, Summer 2009

Space deterrence is defined here as a policy or
process that deters direct attacks on U.S.
satellites in orbit with the goal of permanently
disabling them or temporarily disrupting their
operation. We recognize that the functioning
of satellites can also be disrupted by cyber
attacks or attacks on ground stations.
Deterrence of cyber attacks directed at space
assets is an element of cyber deterrence

and assume that manipulation of these few will allow us
to manipulate the overall system to serve our interest.
We assume that our adversary sees the same variables
as determinative, since deterrence depends on his
perception, not ours. If deterrence succeeds, the policy
is judged effective, though the absence of attack may be
coincidental. If deterrence fails, the situation at D+1
(the next decision point for policy makers) is invariably
different than the situation we envisioned in advance.
The number of variables affected as we move from D to
D+1, and the magnitude of the impact, cannot be
predicted. That truism is reflected in time honored
military bromide: the plan of battle never survives the
first exchange of fire. The incalculability expands
infinitely at the imaginary D+2, and so on. Games and
simulations are designed to bridge the gap between
imagination and reality by testing the conception of
future events against realistic scenarios played out
either by computers or – more usefully – by human
beings. But simulations are a limited tool for at least
three reasons: the players realize that there are no real
world consequences to their acts; bias may be
introduced by the game designer or sponsor, and no
player can accurately reflect the possible adversary
except as he is conceived by ‘our side’. The question
therefore arises: how do we make realistic projections
about the consequences of the failure of deterrence, as
we have to if we are to persuade a possible attacker that
those consequences will be negative for him? The first
answer is that incalculability is itself a deterrent. If a
potential attacker cannot make a reasonable assessment
of the likelihood of success of an attack, he will be less
likely to launch one. But a more accurate answer may
be this: that the point is not that the predicted sequence
of events is realistic, but that it is persuasive – initially
within our bureaucracy and then with possible
adversaries. Ronald Reagan’s projection of a ballistic
missile shield was not realistic, but it was persuasive, so
much so that it caused the Soviets to reassess their
advantage in the strategic balance with the United
States.

3

generally and therefore beyond the scope of
this paper.
Deterring attacks on ground
stations by either hostile states or terrorist
organizations is more properly dealt with in a
study of conventional deterrence. It poses the
same challenges and should be considered in
the same context as attacks on other
communication nodes, electrical grids, water
systems and other elements of the terrestrial
infrastructure.
Nuclear deterrence theory evolved in the Cold
War with the help of game theory, which
claims to apply to any situation in which there
are two or more competitive players.2 We will
argue that some of the concepts developed to
strengthen deterrence in the Cold War are
applicable as well to a “contested” space
environment. On the other hand, space as a
strategic area of operations is unique.
Analogies to Cold War nuclear standoff are
therefore suggestive, but not conclusive. Our
task here has been to identify in what ways
space is unique and what particular challenges
it presents for U.S. deterrence strategy.
The question of deterrence arises now because
the overarching conception of the U.S.
position in space has evolved from “space
control” in the Clinton Administration, to
“unhindered freedom of action in the
Administration of President Bush to
“contested space” now.3 Precise definitions of
2

The most recent of this process, updating it to the
present is “Deterrence: From the Cold War to the Long
War, RAND Project Air Force 2008, available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_M
G636.pdf Our title is a variation on Albert
Wohlstetter’s seminal RAND study “The Delicate
Balance of Terror” of 1958 adapted, in our case, to a
circumstance in which much – but not as much – is at
stake if deterrence fails.
3
“Contested” space is not a phrase that appears in the
Bush Space Policy Document, but is used to
characterize our current situation by AFSPACE
commander Kehler, among others. The Clinton Space
Policy document is summarized at
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what constitutes ‘contested space’ – i.e. who is
contesting space, how they are contesting it
and what precisely is being contested – have
not been universally agreed.
But we can
safely assume that whatever contested space
is, it is something less than either control or
dominance, and therefore describes a situation
in which others will have the capability to
destroy or disrupt U.S. satellites in orbit, and
will have to be deterred from using that
capability.
The Deterrence Operations Joint Operating
Concept (DOJOC)4 study of 2006 concludes
that the goal of deterrence strategy must be to
exercise “decisive influence” on the decision
making processes of a potential attacker. 5 In
fact, deterrence by nature can never be as
absolute as the phrase “decisive influence”
implies.
Deterrence depends on the
decisions of actors who are outside our direct
control and whose perceptions of costs and
benefits may differ from ours. They may
underestimate our capability or our resolve;
they may react emotionally or unpredictably.
Their decision process probably will be
opaque to us and perhaps to them as well. In
sum, no deterrence policy can reduce the risk
of attack to zero, and no national strategic
policy should rely exclusively on deterrence
for national defense. Still, deterrence is an
element of any national security strategy, and
it is relevant to consider what actions are

http://history.nasa.gov/appf2.pdf and the Bush Space
Policy document is at
http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%
20Policy.pdf
4
See www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/
do_joc_v20.doc
5
Decisive influence is the sort of term that emerges
from the dynamics of bureaucratic consensus building.
It sounds more robust than mere “influence” but not so
infeasible as “control” Still, control is what is implies,
i.e. that we can intervene – directly and indirectly - with
decisive effect.

likely to make deterrence more robust and
what actions may weaken it.
It might be thought that adequacy of
deterrence is established by the absence of
attack.
But some would argue that the
absence of attack means only that adversaries
perceive no present need for it, not that they
are inhibited by our policy. Perceptions of
this sort are a function of an individual’s
reading of history, view of conflict,
experience of the world, bureaucratic
responsibility and/or conclusions about human
nature, among other things. The same can be
said of the various schools of thought about
the likelihood of conflict in space; Hays
(following Lupton) describes four such
schools,6 Mueller seven7 – ranging from
inevitable conflict to space as sanctuary.
Theories multiply in the absence of
experience. The United States has never
fought a battle or even a skirmish in space. It
has never faced an opponent with more than
limited offensive capability against its
satellites. In that circumstance, a divergence
of points of view about the nature of any
eventual conflict – and appropriate measures
to avoid it - is inevitable. We conclude that no
consensus is likely on the adequacy of space
deterrence, and no study of this sort should be
aimed at creating one.
The present study
avoids that danger in favor of an entirely
different goal: a concept of space deterrence
useful to decision makers that takes into
account the constraints which surround them,
in particular restraints on available resources.

6

Hays, Peter L. United States Military Space Into the
Twenty-First Century: INSS Occasional Paper, 42, Air
University Press, September, 2002, pp. 11-12.
7
As cited in Moltz, James Clay, The Politics of Space
Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of
National Interests, Stanford Security Studies, 2008, pp.
23-24.
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Section II: Methodology, Terminology,
and Premises
This study is based on open source material.
While it is prudent to assume that space is
technologically dynamic, what programs may
exist in the United States or elsewhere with
the potential to change the existing strategic
situation in space is necessarily unknown to
us. Even the most basic of our assumptions –
that space is, on balance, offense dominant –
is subject to change because of technological
innovation. However, a deterrence strategy
that is effective when offense is dominant will
be even more so if the balance swings more
toward defense.9 We therefore take the worst
case as our starting point.
9

Robert Jervis’ seminal study of the Offense-Defense
balance serves as our guide, “Cooperation Under the
Security Dilemma” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2
(January 1978), pp. 186-214. The classic security
dilemma, outlined by Rousseau and others, holds that
an increase in one state’s security decreases the security
of others, since a state’s intentions about the use of that
security apparatus can never be known if the
capabilities are inherently defensive of offensive.
Jervis clarifies the security dilemma for us by
highlighting two crucial variables, whether defensive
weapons can be easily distinguished from offensive
ones and which of the two has an advantage on the
battlefield. In Jervis’ language, “offense has the
advantage when it is easier to destroy the other’s army
and take its territory than it is to defend one’s own.
When defense has the advantage, it is easier to protect
and to hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and
take. If effective defenses can be erected quickly, an
attacker may be able to keep territory.” Jervis ultimate
argues that the security dilemma is most problematic
when offensive and defensive postures are
indistinguishable and when offense has the advantage.

5

We began our research with the notion that
game theory might give a structure to
consideration of space deterrence.
The
advantage of game theory is that it purports to
be “scientific” – i.e., to provide an objective
standard for judgment amid the thicket of
ideological preconceptions that otherwise
dominate discussions of space security. As
the study progressed, our confidence in game
theory as a useful tool waned. Game theory
presumes rational actors and the DOJOC
study assumes that “truly irrational actors are
extremely rare.” However, the history of
strategic policy is replete with examples of
nominally rational actors behaving irrationally
– because of flawed intelligence, ideological
preconceptions, leadership dynamics, time
pressure, bureaucratic interest, personal
rivalry, lack of experience and poor judgment,
among other reasons.10
We know these
elements of irrationality are true of ourselves,
and can reasonably impute them to others.11
What remains of game theory in this
document is therefore the barest essentials:
that a contest in which the offense has the
advantage will tend to be less stable and more
10

This notion also ignores the ‘crazy man’ theory of
deterrence, i.e. convincing an opponent that your
possible reaction is terrifying precisely because it is not
predictably rational (Schelling and others). Kissinger
employed a variant of this approach without notable
success in his dealings with the North Vietnamese.
11

Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard
University Press, 1960, makes the classic case for
allowing the “weak” rational actor assumption,
particularly on pgs. 16-18. He argues that it is better to
think about rational individuals as those having the
ability to conduct strategic interactions, that is, those
with the ability who try to get something they want with
the knowledge that another actor is trying to acquire the
same thing. As Milton Friedman argues, assumptions
of rationality should be assessed on the benefits and
clarity they produced in their analyses, not on how
emotionally stable an actor might be. “The
Methodology of Positive Economics.” Essays in
Positive Economics University of Chicago, 1953.

6
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prone to escalation, than a contest in which
defense predominates; that adversaries will
seek to exploit an opponent’s vulnerabilities
rather than attack his strengths; that successful
deterrence depends on convincing a potential
attacker that the costs of attack will outweigh
the benefits.12 These are the dictates not only
of game theory but of common sense, and at
least as venerable as the writings of Sun Tzu
and Thucydides.
Nomenclature can and does bias consideration
of space security, which is often characterized
by imprecision of language, the confusion of
metaphor for reality and the use of political
mobilizing slogans in place of analysis. Much
dispute has raged, for example, around the
question of space militarization and/or
weaponization - terms that have become
politically-charged code words for contending
points of view about the future of space.13
Some argue that space is already militarized,
and that the only issue now is how the U.S.
should deploy its space military capability to
best advantage. Others contend that although
space has been used for intelligence and other
12

These “game theoretic” properties are well
established in the contemporary rational choice
literature. See Robert Powell’s “Uncertainty, Shifting
Power, and Appeasement,” American Political Science
Review 90, no. 4 (December 1996), pp. 749-64,
Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal’s “Rational
Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,”
World Politics 41 (September 1989), pp. 143-169,
James Fearon’s “Selection Effects and Deterrence.”
International Interactions 28, 1 (January-March 2000):
5-29 and Barry Nalebuff’s “Rational Deterrence In An
Imperfect World.” World Politics 43, April 1991, pp.
313-335.
13
For the view that space is already weaponized, see
Everett Carl Dolman, “Space Power and U.S.
Hegemony: Maintaining a liberal Order in the 21st
Century” available at http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/
spaceforum/Dolmanpaper%5B1%5D.pdf
Teresa Hitchens gives an opposing view “U.S. Policy:
Time to Stop and Think” http://www.hartfordhwp.com/archives/27b/049.html, but she also thinks
inevitable that “weapons will inevitably go into space”.

military purposes, there remains a political
barrier to weaponization that the U.S. should
not be the first to cross. Our study will not
end this controversy – or even refer to it
beyond this short description. Instead we will
concentrate exclusively on those acts or
policies which can strengthen or weaken
deterrence without regard to how they may be
characterized, attempting to discover whether
they are 1) feasible, 2) affordable, 3) in the
strategic interest of the United States, and 4)
sustainable and effective in the presence of
foreseeable adversary counter measures.
As mentioned above, we assume in this
document that offense is dominant in space.
We note as well, however, that this dominance
is theoretical rather than actual because the
weapons that might establish it, although
technologically feasible, are not – as far as we
can determine – presently deployed.
The
assumption of offense dominance rests on the
notion that it is easier and cheaper to add a
unit of offense in space than it is to add a unit
of defense.14 Later in this study we discuss the
problems with defense, especially of large
satellites that form the backbone of U.S. space
capability. Other modes of deployment are
emerging which could perform many of the
same functions as existing satellites but be
inherently resilient to attack. New forms of
offense may also emerge. In short, within the
twenty-year timeframe of this study, the
offense-defense equation may change.
14

The “Nitze criteria” for cost-effective missile defense
establishes the notion of a defense-dominant
environment as one in which defense measures must be
“cheap enough to add additional defensive capability so
that the other side has no incentive to add additional
offensive capability to overcome the defense.” We
assume that that criterion cannot be satisfied in space,
i.e. that it is cheaper, technologically more feasible and
easier to add a unit of offense to overcome any
incremental improvement in defense. See: “On the
Road to a more Stable Peace”
Department of Public Affairs, Department of State,
Current Policy No. 657, 20 February 1985.
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Insofar as it changes in the direction of
defense, deterrence becomes a less important
subject; so we assume for purposes of this
study that offense will retain its
predominance.
Some will object that our emphasis on
services to the war fighter within the
atmosphere ignores the potential for conflict
in space over the raw materials that may exist
on the moon and various other celestial
bodies. Such conflicts are very unlikely in
the timeframe of this study. Even looking out
fifty or one-hundred years, the notion that raw
materials might be mined economically in
space for use on the surface – and that nations
would fight, for example, over the best sectors
of space or the moon to exploit for this
purpose–is open to serious doubt.15 Exploiting
raw materials in space for use in space may be
a more economically viable option; but it is
not a near or even medium term prospect, and
no business case has been made to attract the
billions in investment capital it would require.
What is and will increasingly be in short
supply in space are orbital position and
bandwidth – both now allocated by
international agreement. The allocation is
imperfect and subject to much dispute; such
dispute will probably increase as more nations
jockey for position in space. On the other
hand, neither orbital position nor bandwidth
lends itself to control by force majeure. Some
commentators believe that the U.S. potentially
has, or could develop, the power to allocate
these scarcities according to its own interests,

15

Exploiting resources in space for use in space could
only be describe as economic when compared to the
cost of launching such resources to space from the
surface. No one has devised a convincing business
case for either model. In general, economic theories
about wealth creation in space ignore principles of
comparative advantage and opportunity costs,
underestimate the capital required, and overestimate the
return to be expected.

7

but no U.S. administration has taken that
view, and none is likely to do so.16
Our study assumes that the list of potential
actors with both the motive and the capability
of contesting with the United States in space is
small, and unlikely to expand greatly over the
next twenty years.
More importantly for
space deterrence, those potential adversaries
are nation states with things of value that can
be held at risk. Terrorists might exploit
weaknesses in cyber defense to launch attacks
that include space assets, but that threat is
defined by the prospects for cyber terrorism
generally.
A terrorist state with space
capability might attempt attacks on U.S.
assets, particularly in connection with
terrestrial hostilities.
Some see emerging
Iranian space capability as an example of this
threat. It cannot be discounted. But terrorist
states are still states with things of value to
hold at risk, and therefore subject to
deterrence by a variety of means. The central
problem of the war on terror – that the
adversary is irrational, fanatical and
undeterred by any threat - is therefore unlikely
to arise as a problem hampering space
deterrence.
Finally, our analysis is based on the
assumption of limited budget resources. If we
assume substantial increases in budgets for
military space, the United States can mount
programs to deal with whatever threats the
imagination can conjure.
Whether such
programs would succeed, of course, is a
different matter; but all things could be
attempted. In the period like that immediately
ahead, on the other hand, policy makers will
have to distinguish between the probable and
the possible treats, and emphasize cost
effectiveness and comparative advantage. In
16

This argument is made, for example, by Everett
Dolman, “Space Power and U.S. Hegemony:
Maintaining a Liberal World Order in the 21st Century.”
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the words of Lord Rutherford: “We have no
money, so we must think.”
Section III: Deterrence and Space
Space deterrence differs from Cold War
nuclear deterrence in several ways. Among
these are some distinctions that make the task
of space deterrence less difficult and some that
complicate it.
Cold War Deterrence
From the time in the late 1960’s when the
Soviet Union achieved rough parity with the
United States in nuclear arms, deterrence from
the point of view of US policy makers shifted
from a reliance on retaliation alone, to an
interplay of retaliation and denial.
The key concern of policy makers was the
possibility of a preemptive nuclear first strike
that would destroy U.S. nuclear retaliatory
capability. The U.S response to this threat
took the form of a series of measures to
ensure the survivability of the nuclear
deterrent, including hardening of ICBM silos,
24-hour airborne alerts by bomber forces, and
increased reliance on less vulnerable systems
like mobile launchers (for intermediate range
missiles) and submarine launched ballistic
missiles.
The concept of the deterrence
“triad” of land-based, air and sea-based
nuclear weapons arises from this period as do
the key doctrines that came to define Cold
War nuclear and conventional strategy:
ensured second-strike capability, flexible
response, escalation dominance, defense in
depth, rapid reinforcement, and survivable
C3I. All were elements to support a strategy
of deterrence by denial, designed to convince
our Cold War adversary that there was no
permanent advantage to be gained at any level
of conflict, whether conventional or nuclear.

Deterrence by entanglement – economic
interdependence for example - played little
role in this era. The autarkic impulse of
Soviet leadership and the containment policies
of the U.S. and its allies worked together to
isolate the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
countries economically from the world
economy, making deterrence by entanglement
minimal.
Deterrence by international norms, including
arms control, was more important, albeit not
always positive from the point of view of the
U.S.
The Soviets pursued a consistent
strategy of promoting international norms and
multilateral arms control agreements designed
to restrict U.S. options, including repeated
initiatives to ban nuclear first strike as well as
general and complete disarmament proposals.
These were the subject of much diplomatic
maneuvering, but had little practical effect.
Later in the Cold War, bilateral and
substantive arms control agreements came to
play a key role.
The likelihood that the nuclear arms race
would not result in a decisive advantage for
either side began to be apparent in the 1960s.
Accordingly, the United States initiated a
parallel process designed to reach an
equilibrium point in U.S. and Soviet
conventional and nuclear arms, beginning
with the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in the
Kennedy Administration. The search for
equilibrium led to a series of arms control
negotiations: limitation (SALT) and then
reduction (START) of overall strategic
arsenals, mutual (the United States added
“balanced”) conventional reductions in
Europe (MBFR), and elimination in Europe of
intermediate range nuclear forces (INF). The
Reagan Administration energetically pursued
the notion of equilibrium at much lower levels
of nuclear arms, a goal symbolized by
Reagan’s decision that what had been nuclear
limitation negotiations (SALT) should be re-
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designated nuclear reduction negotiations
(START).
As space operations became more important
to overall military capability, both the Soviets
and the United States developed and deployed
kinetic kill ASAT systems. Both unilaterally
abandoned those systems, which did not play
an important role in the overall military
balance between the two countries.
A
number of technologies which might have
brought additional offensive space capability –
neutron beam weapons, orbiting rail guns –
were not pursued. Indeed, even at the height
of the Cold War each side refrained from
interference with the other’s space capability,
a tacit agreement that was formalized in later
nuclear arms control treaties in provisions
banning interference with national technical
means of verification (NTM).17
Moltz argues that these developments were by
no means inevitable, but dependent on
individuals and circumstance.18 Still, it is
possible to conclude that each side saw more
value in maintaining its own capability than in
destroying the capability of the other side.
This was true as well of the Soviets, in spite of
the existence in those years of relative
superiority of U.S. military space. In Moltz’
words, both sides desired “stability more than
superiority.”19
Cold War deterrence was successful. The
equilibrium that emerged, although certainly
imperfect, has proven durable, at least by the
standards of great power competition. Even
17

Non-interference with “national technical means”
became codified in the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty (Article V). The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(Article XII) specified the role of NTM for verification
and precluded parties from interfering with or
undertaking measures that would conceal or otherwise
impede verification via NTM.
18
Moltz, p. 50.
19
Ibid. p. 56.
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with the tensions of U.S. anti-missile
deployments to Eastern Europe, and Russian
threats to abrogate the INF treaty, the U.S.
continues to reduce its arsenal of deployed
nuclear warheads. No one now imagines a
second nuclear arms race anything like the
first. Other nuclear powers, like the Chinese,
seem content with limited arsenals.
Unique Challenges of the Space
Environment
Cold War deterrence – both within the
atmosphere and in space - was ultimately
based on symmetry of capability and of risk.
The two sides each had the capability to
destroy the other; neither could entirely ensure
itself against that danger. This balance was
most graphically represented in the doctrine of
“mutual assured destruction” and the “balance
of terror” - key elements of nuclear deterrence
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff (and
fuel the search for an equilibrium point) but
have no direct analogue in space.
On the contrary, space deterrence is seen to
present particular issues because the U.S. is
now uniquely dependent on space assets for its
military capability and therefore potentially
subject to asymmetric attacks in space. This
is the so-called “vulnerability gap”. Since no
potential adversary would have as much at
stake as the United States in a generalized
offensive war in space, the task of deterrence
is seemingly more difficult – some would say,
impossible.
This problem has been
recognized at least since studies in the 1970s,
but the emergence of net centric war and the
Revolution in Military Affairs have increased
dependence and therefore at least in theory
incentive for hostile attack.20
20

The 1975 Schlichter Report and the 1976 Buchsbaum
Panel both cited the growing dependence of U.S. forces
on satellites vulnerable to Soviet attack. Both pointed
to the dangers of an ASAT arms race. The Buchsbaum
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Space deterrence may also be seen as
problematic because two potential deterrence
strategies – deterrence by threat of retaliation
and by denial (including defense) - present
theoretical difficulties in space.
This is
particularly true if space is seen as a area of
operations in itself with a separate military
balance independent of the balance within the
atmosphere. Finally, space deterrence is seen
as problematic because of gaps in our
situational awareness, in particular our ability
to distinguish between intentional and
unintentional interference, i.e. between a
hostile action (perhaps disguised) and the
consequences of operating in a harsh and
electromagnetically active environment.
In short, we identify four central issues that
must be addressed by any coherent doctrine of
space deterrence:
•
•
•
•

The “vulnerability gap” in space
The difficulty of defending space
assets
The credibility of retaliation in an
asymmetric environment
The weaknesses of space situational
awareness (SSA) and attribution of
attack
Vulnerability Gap

That a vulnerability gap exists is not disputed.
The United States has created a military
structure which is heavily satellite-dependent,
without making corresponding improvements
in the survivability of those satellites in a
hostile environment. The result is a classic

Panel did not see U.S. assets as a viable deterrent but
did conclude they might have potential use as a
bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviets on
ASAT arms control. For a review, see
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au18/au18003e.htm

opportunity for asymmetric, preemptive
attack. Because of the vulnerability gap, an
adversary might assume that even if the origin
of an attack in space were known and the U.S.
retaliated in kind by destroying (even
disproportionately) the enemy’s space assets,
he would nonetheless gain by the exchange
since overall U.S. military capability – more
dependent than his on space - would be
disproportionately degraded.
Some believe that this gap will narrow of
itself as the militaries of potential adversaries
modernized and become more dependent on
satellites.21
It is just as likely, in our
judgment, that other space-faring nations will
see our example as one to avoid rather than
emulate. They may be alert to the distinction
between reliance and over-reliance on space,
and less certain of the value added space
provides in the sort of wars they are likely to
fight. They may take advantage of emerging
technologies to deploy space assets in
inherently more defensible modes – rather
than committing to vulnerable satellites that
will still be operating two decades and more
from now. Our reliance on space is fueled in
part by our desire for global reach. Our most
likely competitors are – at least for the
moment – geographically less ambitious and
therefore less in need of space assets to enable
far distant military campaigns. Nor can we
rely on them to follow our example of net
centric war. Who else, for example, is likely
to devote assets to creating a global
communication grid?
Even if potential
adversaries mirror our military space
strategies, they are unlikely to become as
dependent on space as we are, and the
vulnerability gap is therefore unlikely to
narrow significantly. Nor are we likely to
21

Bruce W. MacDonald describes the potential
narrowing of the vulnerability gap in: “China, Space
Weapons and U.S. Security,” Council of Foreign
Relations Special Report Number 38, p. 4.
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achieve the sort of “space control” that would
give us assured superiority in every
circumstance.
As well, it is usually a mistake to adopt
strategies that depend for their success on the
cooperation of potential adversaries. Those
who will potentially contest with us in space
have no interest in reducing our vulnerability
there, or increasing their own. Mirror imaging
of military capability is known in PRC
strategic circles, for example, as falling into
the “Soviet trap.”22 The problems posed by
the vulnerability gap for U.S. space and
strategic policy are real. But they can only be
addressed by our actions and policies, and not
by relying on the actions of others.
The effect of the vulnerability gap on the
effectiveness of deterrence may not, however,
be as great as this analysis would indicate.
Classic nuclear deterrence theory demands
that we hold at risk things of value to an
opponent. We have assumed for forty years
that value equates to utility, and since we
depend more on satellites for our military
reach, the value we attribute to them is
correspondingly higher. But foreign actors
may value satellites far above their immediate
utility – as potential economic growth
multipliers, symbols of national progress, as
tools of political control, or as tokens of status
given the military in return for military
obedience. This may be true in particular of
the PRC, but cannot be discounted in the case
of other emerging space-faring nations. In
short, although our military vulnerability in
space is greater, the value gap may not be so
great. The threat of retaliation in kind, even in
a situation where the U.S. is asymmetrically

22

Paul J. Bolt and Adam K. Gray, “China’s National
Security Strategy,” paper presented at the December
2007 Air Force Institute for National Security Studies
Conference, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

11

vulnerable in terms of capability at stake, may
therefore play a substantial deterrent role.
Difficulties of Defense in Space
The categories of direct, offensive threats to
satellites have been very well understood for
at least four decades. These divide, generally
speaking, into physical threats – impact
(kinetic kill) or proximity explosion – and
electro-magnetic threats, EMP, laser, high
power microwaves, neutron beam.
Both
types of attack can in theory be delivered by
either terrestrially-based or space-based
weapons. The options for defense of satellites
have also been understood: hardening,
maneuver and various guardian or self-defense
satellite schemes. Given limitations on mass,
satellites designers are faced with trade-offs
between capability, service life, and defense.
Generally speaking, they have made the
choice of maximizing capability. This is true
of the large satellites that form the backbone
of U.S. strategic space and of the next
generation of satellites, including GPS- III. 23
Given the state of satellite technology when
these design decisions were made, they appear
in retrospect to have been made with good
reason. Capability was maximized.
The
operating environment remained relatively
benign, at least as regards hostile attack.
Even if designers had assumed a more hostile
environment, it is not certain they would have
altered fundamentally the tradeoff between
capability and defense.
Some space
23

It may be that the cost and development time of
prospective space systems has raised fundamental
questions about the comparative advantage of space,
even for core functions like communications. For
example, General Cartwright told the Space Power
Caucus in July 2008 that, given the cost of TSAT,
perhaps DoD should “invest in airborne comm first”
(Reported in the CAG’s “Legislative Update,” July
2008).
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capabilities, especially reconnaissance and
communication, required large structures in
fixed orbits which are inherently easier to
target and therefore more difficult to defend.
Some defensive measures repay their cost, but
with diminishing returns.
For example, a
satellite can be hardened against EMP and
equipped to counter laser dazzling. It can be
given some maneuver capability.
But it
cannot be hardened to defend against KE
attack; maneuver is limited by on board fuel
supplies (which are also needed for station
keeping and against the contingency of
maneuver to avoid space debris). Finally,
defense against jamming and laser attack may
require, in effect, shutting down operations
temporarily – which is all a potential
adversary may require.
Other measures such as equipping satellites
with on board homing missiles against KE
attack, or providing them with the capability
of moving into parking orbits out of ASAT
range, have been considered but not pursued,
presumably because of prohibitive costs and
technical obstacles. In theory it is also
conceivable that large satellites might be
provided with small guardian satellites
designed to intercept KE attack.
That
technology does not currently exist.
Moreover, KE attacks are only one – and
arguably not the most likely – method an
adversary might use, especially if the goal is
to disable rather than to destroy a satellite.
Stealth would be an ideal alternative for
maintaining the benefits of large strategic
satellites. It would also be ideal to strengthen
deterrence by greatly complicating an
adversary’s attack options. Discussions of
such programs or capabilities are generally not
part of the public discourse.
Another approach for dealing with the
inherent difficulties of satellite defense is
“operationally responsive space” (ORS).

Like other space strategic concepts, ORS has
taken on several meanings. The one most
discussed, however, is the Air Force proposal
to launch on short (30-day) notice satellites to
replace those destroyed by hostile action.
The advent of entrepreneurial companies
promising “cheap launch” has given some
impetus to this idea. But cheap launch has
not been demonstrated, and even if it could be,
an ORS program would likely require
considerable investment. Moreover, a prudent
attacker preempting against U.S. satellites
would enhance chances of success by
retaining second and third strike capability
with far less expenditure of resources than we
would require to replace the assets he
destroys. Although the U.S. would retain the
option of attacking the ground installations
supporting this second or third wave, counter
measures – viz. launcher mobility – are well
within the capability of major space-faring
nations.
Ground-based laser or pulse
weapons could be dispersed and disguised, or
based in unwitting third countries.
The
satellites replacing those destroyed would
presumably be lighter, deployed in LEO
where they would be less resistant to attack
and only available after some delay. That
might be a conceivable option in the era of
large and protracted conventional war (if the
problem of survivability of the satellites could
be resolved). But technology has made
sudden attacks to gain territory or for tactical
advantage more likely, and against this sort of
attack, a month-long loss of initiative could
well be fatal.
Finally, the notion of operationally responsive
space is another example of how
nomenclature can bias analysis. What U.S.
commanders are interested in is not
“operational responsiveness space” but
operational responsiveness itself, however
achieved. Space may very well not be the
most cost effective way of achieving that goal.
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The next generation of GPS satellites will
begin deploying in 2014.
Both GPS and
other systems currently in production are
expected to have a service life of several
decades, which means that U.S. strategic
defenses will depend on large, single point of
failure systems at least until 2040, and
potentially well beyond.
These systems
cannot be retrofitted in orbit to increase their
self-defense capabilities – even if practical
measures were available to do so. Moreover,
the cost of completing programs already
approved as centerpieces of U.S. strategic
space are such as to make the simultaneous
development of alternative technologies
problematic, at least without devoting
considerable, additional resources to military
space. There are circumstances in which this
sort of budget commitment might be made;
but that is hardly a desirable alternative from
the point of view of the United States. Once
the next generation of systems is on line, U.S.
ground, sea and air forces will become even
more dependent on space assets, and therefore
more vulnerable to interruption of the
information they provide.

function satellites. More redundancy would
therefore be possible within existing budgets.
All these characteristics of mini-satellite
constellations would enhance deterrence.
Indeed, adoption of this technology by all
major space-faring nations might create the
defense dominant atmosphere in space which
is not only favorable for deterrence but for a
stable and predictable space environment.

Meanwhile, advances in technology may offer
an inherently more defensible means of
deploying capability in space. Many argue
that mini-satellites hold the promise of basing
mode which is much more difficult for a
possible adversary to target.24 Constellations
of these satellites might provide some or even
most of the same functions of the existing
satellite constellation. They could be designed
to degrade incrementally, in essence
reconfiguring to account for losses of some of
their element to hostile action. Finally (and
again, in theory), mini-satellites would be
cheaper to develop than existing, large multi-

Perhaps the most formidable obstacles,
however, are political and cultural.
It is
difficult to imagine the national leadership
adopting a strategy of relying on unproven
technology for key strategic capabilities,
especially given the sunk costs already
devoted to the next generation of satellites.
Even if this decision were made by the new
administration, the existing (and more
vulnerable) satellite infrastructure would
continue to provide the foundation of U.S.
space capability for many years to come. As
well, the advent of mini-satellites will tend to
level the playing field, and de-value the U.S.
industrial base. That industrial base is built to

There are, however, reasons for skepticism,
not least that no one has so far succeeded in
deploying constellations of mini-satellites.
To quote a noted strategic analyst, “It’s
possible to attribute any qualities you want to
a system you have yet to develop.”25 Thus,
constellations of mini-satellites are said to
have the potential of replacing not only
command and control and electronic
surveillance
functions,
but
even
reconnaissance missions that now require
large structures to accommodate very long
focal point cameras. It is also possible to
conceive of mini-satellites employed as coorbiting hunter killers. None of these visions
has been proven.

24

Will Marshall, “Reducing the Vulnerability of Space
Assets: A Multitiered Microsatellite Constellation
Architecture,” Astropolitics, Vol. 6, No. 2, May 2008,
pp. 154-199.

25

Walt Slocum, referring to the potential CEP of the
MX missile warheads to the author at a time (1983)
when the MX had not yet been tested.
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create large, complex, very capable satellites.
No one can match us in that capability. But it
is of less comparative value in an era of minisatellites, which – as a consequence – have
little attraction for our large, aerospace
companies. It is no coincidence that the locus
of mini-satellite development has in the
universities, or that the trend toward cheap,
low technology launchers has been led by
startups in the private sector.
Prompt Global Strike (PGS) has been offered
as an option to strengthen deterrence by
convincing adversaries that the United States
is capable of destroying threatening capability
anywhere in the world by means (e.g.
conventionally armed SLBMs) against which
there is no defense. This option might be
thought of as active or preemptive defense,
and could be useful as deterrent against an
enemy’s direct assent KE weapons, or against
a second or third wave attack by any other
fixed, surface-based systems.
There are objections to PGS, at least in theory.
For example, PGS assumes availability of
exact and extremely reliable intelligence of
the quality that has been notably absent in
recent conflicts. It employs a delivery means
that, once launched, cannot be recalled – even
if the intelligence changes or the adversary
wishes to capitulate.
Our resort to
conventionally armed SLBMs as a tool of
military conflict could and probably would be
matched by the Russian Federation, and
potentially by the PRC as well. A target of
sufficient value to justify launch of a nuclearcapable intercontinental ballistic missile (even
if conventionally armed) would presumably be
of such urgency that destruction would have to
be assured, requiring launch of more than one
missile, and perhaps a volley. Finally, our
obligations under the START treaty would
require us to notify the Russians before an
SLBM launch; they have no reciprocal treaty
obligation to keep that information

confidential.
Such an interchange might
destabilize the U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear
relationship that remains the most important
single factor in U.S. national security.
Nevertheless, the existence of PGS as
demonstrated capability would have a
deterrent effect on potential adversaries, or at
least those few who themselves possessed no
practical means to retaliate.
We conclude that defense, like the
vulnerability gap, will continue to present
challenges for a policy of space deterrence.
All practical should be done to bolster the
defense of satellites. But the vulnerability of
key space assets will not be overcome within
our twenty-year timeframe.
Attribution of Attack
An abiding issue for space deterrence is the
difficulty in attributing
attack,
and
distinguishing
between
intentional
interference and the consequences of
operating in an electro-magnetically active
and physically harsh environment.
If a
satellite ceases to operate, or operate
effectively, the fact will be immediately
apparent, but the cause may remain unknown.
The problem of attribution is not entirely
unique to space; it exists as well in other
theaters of military operation, particularly the
War on Terror and cyber warfare. The
contestants in the Cold War often used
surrogates and “spoofing” to disguise the real
origins of conventional attacks.
Still,
attribution in space poses particular problems.
In general, we will only become aware of an
attack in space because of its effects. Direct
ascent KE weapons, such as the one tested by
the PRC in 2007, are an exception to this rule;
the origin of the attack of such weapons would
be detected. But for a variety of other attacks
– either from space based interceptors or,
more likely, ground based dazzling or
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jamming – origin may be difficult to
determine, and the identity of the attacker
even more so. For example, a hostile entity
might mount a jamming or dazzling attack
from a third country, as the Iranians
apparently did from Cuba in 2003. The
culprits in that case were eventually
determined, but only after a lapse of some
months. It is conceivable, though not likely,
that a similar operation could be conducted
from neutral countries or even countries allied
with the United States without the knowledge
of the government. It is also possible that we
might attribute the failure of a space system in
a crisis to the action of an adversary, when in
fact, it results from the natural effects of the
space environment itself, such as severe space
weather.26
The most difficult scenario arises if a key
satellite simply ceases to function. In that
case, we may not know – or be able to
discover – the cause of the malfunction.
These difficulties, however, may be more
apparent than real. The likelihood of a
random attack unconnected to some strategic
or tactical purpose within the atmosphere is
remote. The greater likelihood is that attacks
will take place in the context of the failure of
deterrence within the atmosphere, and
therefore as a result of, or in preparation for,
terrestrial hostilities. In context, the source of
the attack will be difficult for an adversary to
disguise. Moreover, the redundancy in crucial
satellite systems like MILSTAR and GPS
means that gaining military advantage would
necessarily involve a coordinated attack on a
number of satellites; an adversary could
hardly expect such an attack to be mistaken
for anything else, or the origin of the attack to
remain long secret. The number of countries
26

“Severe Space Weather,” Science@NASA, 21 January
2009, p. 1. http://science.nasa.gov/ headlines/y2009/
21jan_severespaceweather.htm?list209021
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that might be expected to have both motive
and capability to launch such an attack is
small, and not likely to grow appreciably in
the twenty-year timeframe of this study.
Finally, experience in the Cold War and the
war on terror indicates that we will often
discover the origin of attack not from
detecting the attacker at the time, nor from
direct evidence available at the point of attack,
but from intelligence sources with access to
the information either directly from the
attacking country or through third parties –
not, that is, exclusively from ELINT, but also
from HUMINT sources.
Such detection
might even occur before the fact.
The question from the point of view of
deterrence theory is: will a potential adversary
believe that the origin of his attack on U.S.
space assets can be disguised? Will he make
the key decision based on this assumption? If
so, deterrence is weakened. But – for the
reasons listed above – a prudent adversary
would have to assume that the origin of such
an attack could not be disguised, especially if
the attack were connected with hostilities on
the surface or took place in the context of
tensions between the attacker and the U.S. He
would have to have a plan not just for the
initial attack, but for a strategy if the origin of
the attack were discovered; and if that plan
were not credible, deterrence would be
strengthened. In short, he would have to act
as if the attack would be discovered. His
assessment would be affected by his
perception of U.S. SSA capabilities, as well as
by his assessment of the competence of U.S.
intelligence. He might underestimate our
actual capability.
But just as there is no
substitute in deterrence theory for the
perception that our leadership is competent, so
there is no substitute for a reputation for
competent, all pervasive and all-seeing U.S.
intelligence capability.
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We recognize that these same considerations
may not apply to harassing, transitory
jamming or dazzling interference, exemplified
by the Iran attempt to disrupt a U.S. satellite
from a source in Cuba. On the contrary, more
of these are likely.
If the concern is a
disabling attack on significant U.S. space
capability, however, we believe an adversary
would have to judge the likelihood of
attribution as high, and the affect of disguise
as an effective tactic correspondingly low.
In short, there is no evidence available in open
sources pointing to the conclusion that an
adversary could destroy a significant portion
of the U.S. strategic space capability by
clandestine means; although incidental
attempts to degrade U.S. assets might be
difficult to distinguish from intentional
interference in individual cases, no systematic
attack could be disguised or would likely be
mistaken for anything else. Nor could an
attacker reasonably expect to remain
undetected. It is also possible a natural
occurrence like severe space weather might be
interpreted in time of crisis as a hostile attack.
A bolt from the blue attack, launched with
weapons developed and deployed in secret
and unrelated to a terrestrial conflict may be
conceivable, but is not a practical possibility
in our judgment. Improvements in SSA are
crucial to the certainty of attribution, as are an
improved ability to recognize anomalies in our
space constellation and to use that knowledge
to alert satellite operators and national security
decision makers.
That aspect of the
attribution issue is dealt with below.
Resolve, Red Lines, Trigger Events,
and Deterrence Guarantees
Will an opponent perceive that national
leaders lack the resolve to retaliate for an
attack in space that is invisible to public
opinion and perhaps leaves essential civilian
services intact? It is a notable feature of our

political system that those out of power tend
to doubt that those in power have sufficient
resolve, especially if they belong to a different
party. Military leaders can have these same
doubts about their civilian superiors, and – in
some cases – civilians about the military. In
our country, these doubts are very public and
will be known to a potential adversary, who
may therefore judge retaliation unlikely - not
for lack of capability, but for lack of will.
Doubts have consequences for policy.
Perception of lack of resolve – or the fear that
others may perceive such a deficiency – is one
motivation, for example, behind a policy of
“red lines” or “trigger events”, i.e.,
declarations that certain, specified acts by an
opponent which will automatically trigger
U.S. response.27
These policies have two
goals, one domestic and one international. On
the domestic side they are intended to build
bureaucratic consensus by reassuring doubters
that under certain circumstances, retaliation is
automatic. Internationally, they are meant to
persuade potential adversaries that they cannot
exploit internal weaknesses within the U.S.
political or national strategic communities to
gain advantage, particularly by incremental
attacks.
There are a number of objections to red lines.
To have any significance they must be drawn
around some things but exclude others.
Secretary of State Acheson unintentionally
sent a message to both the North Korean and
Chinese leadership in 1950 by defining our
27

This aspect of trigger events is parodied in the movie
“Dr. Strangelove” by the “doomsday device,” rigged to
destroy the world automatically if the Soviet Union is
under nuclear attack. The strength of the doomsday
device as a deterrent is that it removes all doubts about
“resolve” by taking man (in the fictional case, the
Soviet First Secretary, who might decide not to
retaliate) out of the loop. This example also points up
the importance of making red lines or trigger events
public if they are to have value as deterrents.
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“sphere of interest” in Asia to exclude the
Koreas. Red lines” may also be less red than
they seem, i.e., the fact that leaders feel
impelled to proclaim red lines may be taken as
a sign of ambiguity rather than resolve. In the
Cold War, red lines tended to proliferate
precisely in those areas where retaliation
might otherwise be thought uncertain – both
by our adversaries, and to some degree, by
ourselves. There was no need in those years
to proclaim red lines around the sovereign
territory of the United States, for example. In
Europe and Asia, on the other hand, they
tended to proliferate.
Another objection to “red lines” as external
trigger events is that they tend to be seen (and
used) as limits on the flexibility of the
commander in chief, i.e., as ways to bolster a
potentially wavering national command
authority during times of crisis. But effective
national security leaders will insist on
flexibility in those circumstances whatever
trigger events have been announced or red
lines drawn in advance. Kennedy’s drawing
and then redrawing of “red lines” to give
Soviet leaders a chance to reconsider in the
Cuban missile crisis is perhaps the best case in
point.
In space, red lines may take the form – among
others - of deterrence guarantees for the
commercial constellation.
The question
arises because of the increased use of the
commercial
network
for
military
communication.
All the objections to red
lines apply equally to this question, with the
added problem of credibility, since many
commercial satellites are owned either by
international conglomerates or by countries
that will probably be neutral in any future
space conflict. Would the U.S. risk escalation
in a space conflict to retaliate for attacks on
non-sovereign assets? Would it wish to
forego the option of itself retaliating against
commercial satellites used by adversary
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nations for military communication? Would
the red line of “deterrence guarantee” extend
to some of the constellation, or to all – and if
to all, how credible could it be?
There may be some limited role in crisis for
the use of declaratory policy like red lines.
For example, the U.S. effectively extended a
deterrence guarantee to third country tankers
in the Persian Gulf during the crisis there in
1987.
Those tankers were temporarily
“flagged,” and declared to be U.S. sovereign
assets. Such a temporary tactic may also be
useful in space; at least it should not be ruled
out.
In sum, red lines and trigger events as
elements of doctrine are not a solution to the
problem of perceived strategic resolve, and
may have several negative consequences.
They are therefore of limited use. But the
problem of “resolve” (insofar as it exists
except as a tool of political debate) is not one
that can be solved by doctrine, bureaucratic
organization or declarations. If a possible
adversary perceives lack of resolve, deterrence
is weakened. But the solution is to elect
competent leaders, who will not project
indecision in crises, an issue that is well
outside the confines of this study.
Section IV: Responding to the
Challenges of Space Deterrence
Four Layers of Space Deterrence
Given the unique nature of the space
environment and the fundamental differences
between space systems and nuclear weapons,
we conclude that a layered approach to
deterrence is most appropriate in this context.
Just as the uniqueness of the space
environment poses four distinct challenges for
a strategy of space deterrence (see page 10
above), so we believe that effective space
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deterrence requires a “layered” approach with
four essential elements:
•
•
•
•

International norms
Entanglement
Retaliation
Denial

Deterrence by International Norms
International norms are understood here to
include all treaty and customary law as well as
arms control treaties, test bans, formal and
informal weapons moratoria, confidence
building measures and “rules of the road”.
The question is whether these mechanisms either singly or in combination - have
deterrent effect, and whether they are
legitimately (and even necessary) elements of
a U.S. deterrence policy.
No international agreement is likely to deter a
determined attacker in space any more than on
the surface. Arms control agreements that
have curtailed possible aggressive actions in
space – notably the provisions of the strategic
and intermediate range nuclear arms limitation
agreement, which ban interference with
national technical means (NTM) – have
incorporated rather than created a mutually
acceptable status quo. Finally, it may be the
case that agreements regulating the behavior
of nations in space have only been effective
insofar as any one of those nations have
lacked the capability and/or interest in
violating them. The same could be said, of
course, of any political agreement between
sovereign entities.
The history of multilateral accords specifically
regarding space is one of successive
international agreements, albeit of diminishing
scope.28 The Outer Space Treaty is the most
28

The Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Rescue and
Return Agreement (1968), the Liability Convention

sweeping; among other things, it bans the
stationing of nuclear (but not conventional)
weapons in orbit and military activity on the
lunar surface, stating that the moon and other
celestial bodies must be used for “peaceful
purposes.” In agreeing to these limitations,
U.S. policy makers decided nuclear weapons
had limited utility in space, and that
verification was therefore not essential. The
other provisions of the treaty were similarly
unverifiable, but there is no evidence that any
have been violated, or that nuclear weapons
have been deployed (or are likely to be
deployed) outside the atmosphere.
Meanwhile,
states
were
organizing
internationally under the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) to allocate
bandwidth for communication satellites, and
the United States undertook its own
regulations in that regard administered by the
FCC.
The latest U.S. policy document (2006) tacitly
accepts the benefits of existing legal regimes
in space, while asserting that no additional
regulations are necessary. It asserts a U.S.
right to freedom of action in space,
presumably unhindered even by existing
international agreement (a shift from the
Clinton space policy of 1996). Arguably, this
right is no more than all sovereign nations
insist on; but its assertion was generally
greeted with accusations of U.S. unilateralism
and aspirations to “space control.” Regarding

(1972) and the Registration Convention (1975). Space
activities are also affected by provisions of the 1963
Limited Test Ban Treaty which prohibits nuclear
explosion in outer space, the 1980 Environmental
Modification Convention which prohibits techniques
which produce “long-lasting, severe or widespread
environmental changes in Earth’s atmosphere or in
outer space” is also binding on the Russian Federation
prohibiting interference with national technical means
of verification. See Waldrop, Ibid. p. 13.
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arms control, whereas the space policy of the
Clinton Administration had left open the
possibility of arms control agreements that
were “equitable, effectively verifiable, and
enhanced the security of the United States and
its allies,” the Bush Administration policy
emphasized the negative, ruling out any new
legal regimes or “other restrictions.” It did
not, on the other hand, explicitly rule out arms
control, as long as such regimes did not impair
the rights of the U.S. to conduct research,
development, testing, and operations or other
activities in space.29
Formal agreements affecting interference with
satellites have been effective – indeed, more
effective in the case of “national technical
means” than strictly required by the language
of the treaties that mention them. Both the
Russians and the United States have extended
the “non-interference” ban to the entire
military space constellation of the other. This
is certainly in part because neither side wished
to designate which of its satellites was
involved in the functions covered under the
NTM provisions; but it has undeniably
brought a level of stability and predictability
to the strategic balance between the U.S. and
Russians in space.
Verifiable testing bans can also be effective,
as the Partial Test Ban Treaty has shown. An
adversary is unlikely to launch a preemptive
attack with weapons he has never tested under
realistic conditions. Such tests in space –
29

The Bush space policy document reportedly went
through thirty-four drafts, a good indicator of a
brokered result. That would account for language
which, on the one hand, does not explicitly rule out
arms control (thus satisfying some bureaucratic
interests), but on the other hand makes arms control
practically impossible (thus satisfying others). It
would also account for the inconsistency of insisting on
a sovereign right to freedom of action, while also
asserting a right to deny such freedom to other
sovereign nations.
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particularly of KE vehicles – would be seen.
There are those who argue that a single test
might be disguised and would be sufficient.
That is not likely, in our view. Since the U.S.
has renounced the option of KE ASAT
weapons, and given the growth in
international concern about space debris in
recent months, a ban on KE ASAT test may
be a very productive approach by the United
States to future arms control in space.
Informal international norms can also be
effective. For example, the PRC reportedly
followed its KE test with informal assurances
in Europe and the United States that the test
would not be repeated.
Reports have
meanwhile leaked to the press of two previous
PRC tests of the same system that had failed.
The U.S. apparently had observed those
failure as well as preparations for the eventual
successful test. The U.S. did not intervene
diplomatically to stop any of the tests; it did
not publicly protest the successful test,
although several other countries did, and the
U.S. made representations only about the
resulting debris field. In this case, the U.S.
was abiding by its own strictures about
freedom of action in space. To have protested
the Chinese attack would have been to
acknowledge the existence of some informal
norm of behavior which bound all spacefaring nations, something which the United
States has specifically denied. Still, the
political result of the Chinese test tended to
confirm the existence of such informal norms
sufficient to persuade the Chinese not to
pursue this sort of testing. The U.S., too, must
react to such informal norms, one reason
perhaps that the Bush Administration,
probably more receptive than its predecessors
to the notion of stationing weapons in space,
did not pursue that option. Indeed, the 2006
space policy document, although characterized
by some on the Left as more aggressive than
its Clinton Administration predecessor, was
arguably in some ways more cautious.
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Finally, arms control negotiations can
facilitate
communication
and
provide
information about what is really of value to an
opponent. For example, we learned in the
process of strategic arms negotiations with the
Soviet Union that we had overestimated the
value they attached to large, MIRV’d ICBMs,
and underestimated the value they ascribed to
preventing the U.S. from deploying an
effective anti-ballistic missile system. That
knowledge informed the U.S. approach to
both strategic policy and arms control over the
following two decades.
In short, arms control and other international
norms can be an aid to deterrence, and can
help in discerning a potential adversary’s
intent and the relative value he ascribes to his
space and other strategic assets.30 Arms
control agreements which verifiably limit
testing can strengthen deterrence by
decreasing an adversary’s confidence in his
chances of success, enhance warning of a
change in the strategic environment, and help
dampen an arms race in areas otherwise of no
interest to the United States (such as KE
vehicles).
Verification of agreements in
space remains an obstacle. As far as we can
determine from open sources, for at least the
last decade the government has not sponsored
active efforts to determine how technological
advances might be leveraged to enhance
verification of space arms control agreements.

30

General Kehler, speaking at the 2008 National Space
Symposium, acknowledged the potential benefit of such
an approach when he stated that “a diplomatic mission
to sway a would-be space attacker could outweigh the
use of offensive counterspace options,” Inside the Air
Force, April 2008. The history of cooperative
measures in the Cold War has been analyzed in greater
detail by Jervis (1976), Axelrod (1984), and Moltz
(2008).

Deterrence by Entanglement
Deterrence by entanglement is the notion that
state actors will be deterred from attacking
others because of economic interdependence.
The notion has a checkered history. Norman
Angell
speculated
in
1913
that
interdependence of trade in Europe made
another European War impractical.31 In fact,
two wars followed in the next four decades.
Still, the degree of globalized interdependence
that characterizes the modern world is without
precedent. It is also different in kind. In the
first decades of the 18th Century,
interdependence was based on trade in
tangible goods, and governments still
controlled both trade and investment flows.
Governments could decide to forego certain
economic advantages, including those arising
from trade, in the service of national
ambitions. In our new millennium, wealth
has increasingly lost its relationship to
tangible goods, and governments no longer
control the flow of foreign investment, which
can now occur instantly because of the
independent
decisions
of
multiple
international actors who have concern only for
maximizing profits and minimizing losses.
Seven trillion dollars of “wealth” was
destroyed in the United States in a period of
two weeks in September/October of 2008 –
and many trillions more in the rest of the
world – without a shot being fired or, indeed,
any tangible wealth being affected in any way.
Governments might have wished to deter
investors from the decisions that led to this
widespread and virtual destruction of wealth,
but lacked the means to do so. They were at
the mercy of something that can be
summarized by the phrase “investor
confidence.”

31

Norman Angell, The Great Illusion, New York and
London, 1913.
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Judgments of the market now extend to all
globalized economies, regardless of ideology
or political system; the only defense is to take
an economy “off the grid” – a solution
employed by the regime in Burma, for
example, but no longer available to leaders in
the United States, China, India or – indeed –
any other country which might be considered
a future adversary of the United States in
space.
This new international economic
interdependence is perhaps best exemplified
by the relationship of the U.S. and the PRC
which has led to a U.S. trade deficit created by
purchase of PRC consumer goods financed by
PRC purchase of U.S. Treasury bonds.32
Deterrence by entanglement, therefore, is not
only now a function of interdependence, as it
was thought to be a century ago. Although we
are “entangled” economically with the
Chinese, perhaps even to the point of deterring
hostile Chinese acts against U.S. interests in
their geographic sphere of influence, both
China and the United States are entangled in
an international financial system which neither
country can control, and the judgments of
which are final.
Satellites, of course, are one communication
node in that financial system.
Any
generalized breakdown in that system which
could not easily be repaired – for example, the
destruction of all satellite communication by
nuclear detonations in space – would threaten
“wealth” on a massive scale. It might be
argued that repercussions would be less severe
on China than the United States, because
much of the Chinese economy is not
globalized. The argument is not persuasive.
The impact of a generalized destruction of
space assets would have a considerable impact
on Chinese business and political elites, i.e.
those whose decisions matter. The impact on
growth areas of the Chinese economy would
32

James Fallows, “The $1.4 Trillion Question,” The
Atlantic, January/February 2008.
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be particularly serious. Reconstruction of the
financial system without space assets – or with
sufficient terrestrial backup to restore
confidence in reliable financial transactions –
would be a formidable and time-consuming
task.
Even an attack on a significant
proportion of the commercial satellite
infrastructure would have huge consequences
for the wealth of globalized economies. It is
difficult to envision the sort of gain in foreign
or security policy terms that would offset this
potential economic loss.
Entanglement extends beyond financial
transactions to all the various applications of
GPS satellite data. The U.S. ended encoding
of GPS data in 2000. Since then, our most
precise GPS signal has been available
globally. That signal is now built into electric
and transportation grids worldwide - among a
vast number of other systems and devices,
creating
a
degree
of
technological
entanglement (and potential economic loss)
that could only be truly appreciated if the GPS
signal were suddenly to disappear.33
The example of GPS demonstrates
entanglement when civilian applications of a
system originally built for a military purpose
proliferate globally. In such cases, the effects
of any attempts to deny the original military
function would not be confined to one country
in a crisis, but would unavoidably draw in
other states who have become reliant upon
space over time. The reverse situation also
obtains. Communications systems originally
built for civilian, commercial purposes now
carry a variety of necessary military traffic,
including data from unmanned air systems

33

The degree of interdependence on the GPS signal by
2001 is described, inter alia, in The Rumsfeld Report.
See “Report of the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization
Pursuant to Public Law 106-65, p. 23.
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such as the Predator.34 Hostile action to
disrupt military communications over
commercial systems would likely draw into
the crisis numerous other governments whose
own military or civilian traffic is carried by
the same satellite as one of the warring
factions.
Because the use of civilian
commercial transponders is market-based and
constantly shifting, an aggressor’s planning
would be complicated by the inability
effectively to predict which other friendly,
neutral, or potentially adversarial states would
be affected at any given moment by
interference with a particular commercial
satellite.35 The prospect of an expanding
global market for satellite services means the
unintended economic consequences of any
attack on commercial – and even some key
military satellites – will likely expand over
time.
This entangling web of mutual
dependence and shared consequence will act
as a deterrent on the policy makers of all
globalized economies.
We are entangled with others in space
physically as well as an economically, a fact
highlighted by the recent conjunction of a
Iridium and Cosmos satellite over Siberia
which created a still expanding cloud of space
debris. Other near misses in both LEO and
GEO during the first months of 2009 further
underlined the space debris issue, which was
one of the reasons the U.S. backed away from
KE counter satellite technology – and why the
Chinese KE test of January 2007 was viewed
with such alarm. No one knows how frequent
34

Don Branum, “Coalition Force Reaper Unit Deploys
to Joint Base Balad,” Air Force Print News Today, 21
November 2008,
www.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?id=12312565.
35
Then Colonel, now Lieutenant General Frank Klotz
wrote in 1999 “The health and safety of some civilian
satellites may become just as important to the outcome
of an armed conflict as those of dedicated military
satellites.” See Space Commerce, and National
Security, Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, p. 10.

conjunctions will be in the future. That will
depend, in part, on improvements in space
situational awareness and in the systems by
which information is shared between
operators. All agree that each conjunction
increases the chances of more, and the
eventual possibility of a cascade of
conjunctions that will make low earth orbit and the more popular orbits in GEO - more
dangerous, increasing the costs of operating
there and bringing further into question the
comparative
advantage
space
offers
commercial operators. Any large ASAT
exchange in space would scatter debris
precisely in those orbits most useful for ISR
and communication of the combatants, and
would raise the danger of making space
unavailable for military and commercial users
alike for as long as the resulting debris
remained in orbit.
As noted above, however, sovereign
governments have the power, at least in the
short term, to ignore or sacrifice their
economic interests – and those of succeeding
generations - to immediate strategic gains.
Deterrence by entanglement is therefore one,
but certainly not the only, component of a
deterrence strategy.
Deterrence by Retaliation
Perhaps the most disputed question and the
most intractable dilemma of space deterrence
is whether it requires a space-for-space
retaliatory option to be credible.
In other
words, will an adversary believe that it can
attack vital U.S. space assets with impunity if
the U.S. lacks the option of retaliating in
space?
The analogue from Cold War deterrence
theory is the notion of escalation dominance.
The theory held that deterrence could best be
maintained if the Soviets perceived that the
U.S. was superior at every stage of potential
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escalation: thus, the U.S. could counter
conventional aggression on allies with
conventional force, theater nuclear with
theater nuclear force, strategic attack with
strategic forces. Seeing 1) U.S. willingness to
escalate, and 2) the impossibility of achieving
advantage through escalation itself, the
Soviets would decide that attack would
achieve no permanent advantage. But this
depended on credible forces being deployed at
each rung of the escalatory ladder.
Is the same thing true in space? The answer
is partly political rather than theoretical. If a
potential adversary deployed space-based
ASATs, it can safely be assumed that the U.S.
would have no political choice but to follow
their lead.
Aside from the expense, the
resulting arms race would not be in the
interests of the United States as predominant
and most vulnerable actor .36 A space arms
race would also have negative consequences
for the commercial space industry, which
depends on a stable and predictable space
environment to justify large investments that
space commercial infrastructure requires. But
none of these arguments would likely prevail
in a situation where a potential adversary
threatened to achieve an asymmetric
advantage. As well, the existence of such
weapons in orbit unmatched by American
capability would have a chilling effect on U.S.
policy makers, and might limit their choices in
situations of crisis.
Some would argue that this space arms race is
already in progress, although confined for the
moment to laboratories and “dual use”
systems assumed to have some counter space
capability. A future race in space is inevitable
36

The expense is literally unknowable. Even the cost
of existing programs is calculable only within wide
orders of magnitude. We can assume, however, that the
cost of ASAT arms race in space would be very
considerable indeed.
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from this point of view; the U.S. should
assume that others are working on orbiting
ASAT weapons and begin work itself rather
than allowing an asymmetric threat to develop
in space.
On the other hand, no country currently
deploys an ASAT system in space; the only
system which might be so described – the
Soviet co-orbiting KE ASAT system – has not
been tested in twenty-five years. Whether any
future space-based ASAT systems are in
development cannot be determined from
unclassified sources. That the U.S. would
have failed to detect “dual use” or “sleeper”
satellites in orbit is possible in theory; in
practice it has not been a claim made by
responsible military commanders who would
seem to have little motive to keep secret the
existence of such a threat.
In short, we
conclude that there is a threshold that has not
been crossed between our current strategic
situation in space and events (some within our
control and some not) that would trigger a
space-based ASAT arms race. Others may
have evidence to prove that conclusion wrong.
If so, it will be included in the responses to
our study we intend to publish when
comments on it become available.
There is another potential technological space
competition that is visible in the open
literature and, in our judgment, will set the
tone for the future, i.e., devices intended to
incapacitate
satellites
temporarily
by
degrading, denying or disrupting their
operations or their signals.37
Ground-based
systems have a number of advantages in that
role. The barriers to entry – in both capital
and technology - are lower. The availability
of energy is comparatively unlimited, unlike
space based systems where on-board energy
37

See also: Elizabeth S. Waldrop, “Weaponization of
Outer Space: U.S. National Policy” in Annals of Air
and Space Law, Vol. XX1X, p. 10.
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supplies are a limiting factor in capability.
The effects produced by ground based
interference may be decisive in conflict, but
are transitory, do not create space debris,
perhaps delay attribution, and provide (or so it
may seem to an attacker) less of a trigger for
retaliation.
Jamming and dazzling devices
already exist; the United States cannot prevent
their future evolution and proliferation. The
U.S. has its own program of “tactical denial”
as a key element of space strategic policy. It
is prudent to assume that Russia, the PRC and
potentially other space-faring nations have
similar programs. Accordingly, outcome of
future hostilities on the surface between the
United States and a technologically
sophisticated space-faring opponent may be
decided by which side is more able to negate
the satellite assets of the other, and to preserve
relatively more of its own capability. This
tactic is not without technological hurdles of
its own.
For example, the problem of
“frequency overlay” makes it difficult to jam
the satellites of possible adversaries without
also jamming the signals from allied satellites
and potentially even one’s own. Still, in this
area, as in others, technological superiority
will be important.
If adversaries are
convinced that U.S. “fight through”
disruptions in space while disrupting the space
services of adversaries, deterrence will be
enhanced.
Some argue that robust space deterrence
requires a deployed ASAT capability in space,
so that attacks in space can be answered in
kind. Such a capability faces political and
budgetary obstacles. Congress has been
consistently cool to the idea on grounds of
cost and the conviction that an offensive
ASAT arms race in space would not be in U.S.
interest. Others do not face similar obstacles.
There are, however, potential mitigating
factors.
First, an adversary could not be
certain that retaliation would be limited to

space. Although the threat of escalation is
often portrayed as inhibiting rather than
empowering U.S. decision makers, that threat
would also have to be taken seriously by an
adversary. U.S. declaratory policy has always
emphasized that retaliation for attacks on vital
assets will be of a magnitude and by means of
our choosing.38 No rational adversary could
rule out a disproportionate response or socalled “horizontal escalation” (for example in
the cyber domain), especially if his conclusion
was the same as ours: that limiting ourselves
to space-for-space retaliation would leave the
U.S. at a disadvantage. He would also have
to take into account the possibility of a less
than rational response to his action, perhaps
leading to an even more rapid escalation.
The Cold War analogy is brinksmanship, the
willingness to escalate unpredictably when
vital strategic interests are threatened.
The second mitigating factor is that even in
the absence of dedicated ASAT systems, a
potential attacker is not likely to perceive the
U.S. lacks capability to retaliate against the
space assets of an adversary. Many nations
perceive existing U.S. ballistic missile defense
systems as having a dual-use nature, including
potential anti-satellite capability. The U.S.
reportedly has an active and acknowledged
program of “negation” designed to deny an
adversary the use of his space assets as force
multipliers in the case of hostilities within the
atmosphere.
We may safely assume that
other nations are pursuing similar programs.
In our judgment, the most likely scenario for
future space conflict is a “war of negation,”
i.e. an attempt by each side to preserve the
product of its space assets while denying those
space services to the opponent. To win such
a contest requires technological superiority,
38

See Joshua M. Epstein, “Horizontal Escalation,”
International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3, Winter 1983/84,
pp. 19-31.
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which the U.S. should make every effort to
maintain and which, in this area as in others, is
a vital element in maintaining space
deterrence.

one risk off against others. No bureaucratic
arrangement, declaratory doctrine or weapon
capability will compensate when such
leadership is not present.

We conclude that the threat of retaliation can
remain a credible element of our overall space
deterrence. The attribution of attack is not an
insuperable obstacle, and that questions of
resolve will ultimately depend on the
perceptions of a potential attacker in the
circumstances existing when his decision to
attack is being considered. A credible threat
of retaliation may require willingness to
escalate into other domains. It could include
fielding ASAT systems if such systems are
deployed by others, but the resulting arms race
would not be in the interests of the United
States. The U.S. should not be the first to
deploy such systems and the U.S. use the full
extent of its influence internationally to avoid
that outcome.
Ultimately, a threat of
retaliation is never more credible than the
leader and the government that issues it. No
declaratory policy can compensate for an
irresolute commander in chief, one who is
misinformed or badly served by his
subordinates. An opponent will tend to judge
the likelihood of retaliation not according to
proclamations made months or years earlier,
but according to the situation pertaining at the
time – as Hitler did in Europe and Saddam did
in the Middle East. What a President does in
the run up to and conduct of a crisis will have
far more to do with an adversaries decisions
than libraries full of ultimatums and
guarantees.
Subordinates who doubt the
resolution of a commander will try to limit his
or her flexibility to respond other than in ways
the subordinates think appropriate. A wise
commander in chief, on the other hand, will
strive to maintain flexibility, to approach a
particular conflict in the context of wider
responsibilities, to take account of factors
which were unforeseen when the doctrine or
battle plan was devised – in short, to balance

Deterrence by Denial
Deterrence by denial is a policy which
convinces an adversary undeterred by norms,
economic costs, or the threat of retaliation that
in the end he cannot achieve the purposes
intended by launching an attack. During the
Cold War, the advent of long-range nuclear
missiles and Soviet conventional superiority in
Europe combined to make denial problematic
as a centerpiece of doctrine. A host of Cold
War doctrines – flexible response, defense in
depth, rapid reinforcement, assured secondstrike capability – were developed to make
deterrence by denial more credible.
The
advent of the “triad” of submarine launched
ballistic missiles, hardened land-based ICBMs
and strategic bombers on airborne alert could
also be portrayed as elements of a denial
strategy. President Reagan’s SDI initiative in
1983 brought deterrence by denial to the
forefront in the nuclear standoff, at the same
time moving the emphasis away from the
balance of terror.
The nub of the political debate in the United
States in these years was whether these were
steps to enhance deterrence or preparations for
war fighting.
In fact, they were both by
necessity. No policy of deterrence by denial
could be credible without the perception that
the U.S. could absorb an initial attack
(whether conventional or nuclear) and still
fight and win the resulting war, delivering
unacceptable damage to the enemy.
Accordingly, no strategy of space deterrence
by denial can be credible unless a potential
adversary perceives that the U.S. military
capability within the atmosphere will not be
crippled by attacks in space, i.e. that the U.S.
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will retain superior war fighting capability
even after an initial attack.
If to this
perception is added the conviction that his
own space or other capability will also be
degraded or destroyed in the process,
deterrence is that much stronger.
Section V: Recommendations
This study argues that deterrence in space
cannot be oriented around a single concept or
created by measures limited to space alone.
Instead space deterrence must be considered as
a series of successive layers, some of which
involve space assets and some of which
require better exploitation of existing assets in
the atmosphere. Together, a layered deterrence
framework will be more responsive to changes
in the dynamic security environment and
provide policy makers with a variety of
choices
in responding
to hostile
action.
We believe
a layered
space
deterrence
framework can be created and strengthened by
the following eight steps:
1. Improve Space Situational Awareness
Deterrence
depends
upon
accurate
information, especially in discriminating
between intentional and unintentional/natural
interference, in assessing the operation of
rules of the road, in verification of any future
arms control agreements, and in enhanced
warning – all elements of an effective
deterrence posture. Aside from its role in
deterrence, improved SSA is necessary to
allow more efficient use of orbital space, for
space traffic management and for tracking and
mitigation of space debris. The U.S.
recognized the importance of SSA by
assigning responsibility for this issue to
Strategic Command in the Unified Command
Plan. This will promote a joint approach to the
issue, with the Air Force and sister services
providing the capabilities required.

Beyond this, however, the United States
should:
• Invest in better sensors, more satellites, and
improved
ground
equipment,
and
communication/synergize existing data to
create a more effective database and make
better use of the information we have.
• Undertake a thoroughgoing review of data
in the public domain to determine the scope
of information that can be exchanged with
other
spacefaring
states
without
compromising security interests.
• Reach agreements with commercial
operators to upgrade future satellites to
include SSA sensors, either integral to
satellite design or as hosted payloads.
• Seek agreement with coalition of allies and
other spacefaring states on the scope of
information exchange with commercial
operators.
• Establish a clearing house for exchange of
SSA information in the form of a limited
access “blog” or website on which both
governments and private operators can post
whatever information they choose; as
confidence in such a system builds, better
and more complete information will appear,
inaccurate
information
can
be
identified/isolated, and a broader database
will be created.
• Encourage rather than discourage likeminded spacefaring states to improve their
SSA capabilities.
2. Internal Red Lines – Space Alerts
Internal red lines – thresholds of interference
that activate system wide alert and trigger
notification to the national command
authority – are not just useful in themselves
but an element of deterrence. They would be
equivalent in space to the DEFCON system
which has proved effective both in its
intended function – to increase the military
alert level – and also as a diplomatic signal to
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a potential attacker not only that forces are on
alert, but that the attention of those within our
government with the power to order
retaliation is engaged. This system would
also force military space operators to create a
system to identify a trigger level of
anomalies/degradations that should be
brought to the attention of the NCA whether
or not the source of problem can be
immediately identified. Adversaries may try
to spoof this system (as all such systems), but
two can play that game.
3. Defense
Insofar as defense of satellites can be
enhanced, both deterrence and security are
strengthened. But the concept of defense
should be extended to defending our
capability, rather than just the satellites.
Historically, defense of satellites – chiefly by
hardening and maneuver – is expensive,
compromises capability for a given mass, and
quickly runs into diminishing returns.
4. Deploy Space Assets in Inherently
More Defensible Modes
Vulnerability can be lessened – and deterrence
enhanced – by moving to constellations of
smallsats that are more difficult both to detect
and to attack. Smallsat technology is evolving
rapidly, although it is unproven as a substitute
for key elements in our national security space
constellation. In addition, there are some
intelligence and reconnaissance functions
smallsats may not be able to replace and –
realistically – the existing space infrastructure
will continue to rely on large, single point of
failure systems at least through the 20-year
timeframe of this study. Still, the U.S. cannot
afford to lag in smallsat development, and
they may be a near-term solution to
maintaining essential space services in a
hostile space environment.
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5. Operational Responsiveness in place of
Operationally Responsive Space
Our analysis leads us to conclude that the
notion of “operationally responsive space” is
impractical on the one hand, and too limiting
as an operational concept on the other hand. A
prudent attacker will retain capability against
a second-wave or third-wave of space
deployments. Even the most optimistic
assumptions assume a gap of 30 days before
some capability could be restored, which in
modern war may be more than enough for an
attacker to achieve decisive advantage. Our
goal, on the contrary, should be to maintain
operationally responsive services to the
warfighter from a host of different sources,
using existing technology within the
atmosphere and on the surface.
For example:
• Exploit existing and new air breathing and
lighter than air platforms, both manned and
unmanned. The ability to surge air
breathing and lighter than air platforms to
restore capability lost from attacks on
satellites is crucial to a policy of deterrence
by denial and also to warfighting if
deterrence fails.
• Expanding capability of fiber optic and
airborne communication within theater
could provide an alternative to space at
acceptable cost and using known
technology. Existence of such an option
would complicate attempts to compromise
U.S. capability and force an attacker to
compete successfully in yet another arena –
thus, strengthening deterrence.

6. Expand Military Use of the
Commercial Constellation
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The commercial constellation is a central
factor in “deterrence by entanglement,” and
also a means to complicate targeting options
for any potential adversary. Military
communication is already carried on
commercial satellites and that usage expands
in time of active hostilities. The U.S. cannot
replace the space capabilities that the
commercial sector provides (e.g., up to 80%
of all communications bandwidth). The
practice of buying transponder time on the
spot market enhances deterrence with the
space equivalent of multi-aim point basing.
The U.S. should encourage the expansion of
the commercial network by guaranteeing
multi-year buys, in return for satellite
operators agreeing to harden future satellites
against EMP and other hazards, and equipping
them to protect classified communication and
with sensors to aid SSA. It may also be useful
to overbuy transponder time, especially in
times of crises. We do not recommend
extending a general deterrence guarantee to
the commercial sector. If the inherent
deterrent of mutual dependence does not
discourage a potential attack, it is unlikely that
a U.S. guarantee would do so; a deterrence
guarantee would make these satellites
legitimate military targets; and a deterrence
guarantee for non-U.S. assets would tend to
not be credible, would decrease U.S.
flexibility in crisis, and might be actively
opposed by commercial, multi-national
satellite operators.

Accordingly, the U.S. should inaugurate a
multi-service effort to train and equip to fight
without space. The recent “day without space”
points the way. This may be initially an issue
of consciousness-raising for field officers;
what to do if the “screen goes blank.”

7. Become Potentially Less
Dependent on Space

The present U.S. space deterrence posture is
problematic. We have increased our space
capability, but increased as well the potential
benefit to an attacker of destroying or
disabling that capability. We have improved
bilateral cooperation with some allies; but we
have not rallied international support for the
fundamental principles of our space policy.
Our efforts to slow the transfer of space
technology to potential adversaries have not
prevented the emergence of counter space

Deterrence cannot be effective if an adversary
believes he can gain decisive advantage on the
battlefield by destroying or interrupting
services from the U.S. space constellation. If
he believes, on the other hand, that the U.S.
will retain a decisive conventional and nuclear
advantage even with interruption of space
services, deterrence will be enhanced.

8. Seize the Political Initiative
The U.S. should be the leader in building
consensus for measures to create a stable and
predictable environment in space; no other
power can take the lead, none has more to
gain. The U.S. has been the leader in space
debris mitigation, but has yielded the initiative
to others on “rules of the road” and on space
arms control, insisting instead on a “freedom
of action,” which is in any case largely
illusory given the thicket of regulatory
regimes to which the U.S. is party.
Accordingly, the U.S. should:
• Sponsor an international regime on rules
of the road in the UN Committee on
Disarmament.
• Propose a verifiable ban on KE ASAT
testing in space.
• Formalize
consultations
with
the
Europeans on space within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
• Actively pursue a series of discussions on
space with the PRC.
Conclusions
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capabilities elsewhere, and may have
weakened our own space technological base.
We have moved tentatively toward deploying
more and cheaper satellites, but our core effort
remains concentrated on a few, large, very
expensive and difficult to defend systems –
that will still be the backbone of our space
constellation for decades to come. In defense
of our freedom of action in space, we have
worked to discredit legal or political
impediments to the testing of ASAT weapons
by others, without overcoming the theoretical,
political or budgetary obstacles to testing such
systems ourselves.
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of deterrence. President Reagan’s vision of a
defensive arms race may be applicable to
space as well, but that won’t happen in the
medium term. In sum, the Roman consul
Flavius Vegetius Renatus is remembered for
the phrase: if you would have peace, prepare
for war. Our conclusions can be summarized
in a similar phrase: if you would have peace in
space, prepare for war without it.

Although, as we have argued here, deterrence
in never assured, the optimal approach for the
U.S. in space is a “layered” approach, which
combines the strengths of a number of
deterrence strategies, avoids the weaknesses
of each in isolation (especially in space), and
deterrence, which combines the strengths of
mutually reinforcing deterrence strategies
while ensuring – as perhaps the key element in
any space deterrence posture – that the U.S.
can “fight through” even if deterrence fails,
i.e. that our terrestrial forces will not be
paralyzed even if the screen goes blank.
This outcome cannot be achieved by assuming
that space capabilities can only be replaced
with space capabilities. It cannot be achieved
if an adversary assumes that retaliation for
attacks on space capabilities will be limited to
space. It cannot be achieved if our forward
planning does not account for interruption of
space capability just at those times –on those
fields of battle - where it is most necessary.
And it cannot be achieved if the United States
isolates itself technologically and politically,
allowing others to establish the political
agenda for space.
New forms of deployment with more
emphasis on defense may eventually solve the
vulnerability problem and with it, the problem
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A Good Starting Point for Deterrence
Dean Cheng
CNA

A central focus for much of the Cold War was
determining what would deter the Soviet
Union; this was a topic upon which many of
the West’s best and brightest labored to
determine. In order to deter the former Soviet
Union, a huge intellectual edifice was erected,
which helped guide a variety of military
programs, including not only the American
strategic triad of land-based and sea-based
missiles and manned bombers, but tactical
nuclear weapons, hardened command and
control, and space-based early warning
systems. It also incorporated concepts, such as
“extended
deterrence,”
“escalation
dominance,”
and
“mutual
assured
destruction.”
Unfortunately, much of this effort turned out
to be problematic. Although the Soviets
accepted the concept of deterrence, they did
not develop a counterpart to the intricate
Western theories associated with deterrence,
including such elements as selective targeting
or deliberate escalation. Nor did they accept
the idea that vulnerability was desirable for
reasons of strategic stability – a cornerstone of
“mutual assured destruction.”39
In discussing the prospects for space
deterrence, the authors exhibit the strengths
and weaknesses of this legacy. The paper as
CNA is a non-profit research organization that operates the
Center for Naval Analyses and the Institute for Public
Research. The opinions expressed herein are those of the
author. Address correspondence to: Dean Cheng, (703) 2811083 (telephone), deanbcheng@gmail.com (e-mail).
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presented builds atop the long tradition of
deterrence theory and writings, and provides
an excellent overview of potential approaches
and policy responses. But it also exhibits
certain key limitations.
One limitation is the decision to restrict the
discussion of deterrence to a focus on spacebased systems. While the need to bound the
problem is understandable, it raises the
fundamental question of whether those who
would be deterred will necessarily function
within the same boundaries and constraints.
While perhaps beyond the scope of this
specific commentary, the matter of space
deterrence needs to incorporate the ability to
deter attacks against the entire space
infrastructure, including systems in orbit,
terrestrial launch and mission support
facilities, as well as the communications and
data channels that link all these elements
together.
The other limitation echoes the problems of
Cold War deterrence; namely, whether all the
relevant states upon which space deterrence is
expected to apply actually share a common set
of beliefs and values. Upon this rests such key
assumptions as whether both sides are likely
to pursue “prudent” courses of action in
peacetime or in crisis, whether the status quo
is considered acceptable (and therefore is the
preferred state of affairs) or whether there
exist “red lines” and how identifiable they
may be.
Specifically in the case of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), it is worth
considering whether their concepts of
deterrence and those of the United States are
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compatible. For example, People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) authors discuss in their textbooks
the utility of undertaking anti-satellite (ASAT)
tests as a means of establishing the credibility
of deterrence. They also note that the costs of
replacing space systems may help coerce an
opponent, as coercion is an integral part of
Chinese conceptions of deterrence.40 This is a
very different perspective from that of the
authors of the deterrence study. Similarly,
despite being a member of the Inter-Agency
Space Debris Coordinating Committee
(IADC), the PRC was not “deterred by
entanglement” from engaging in the January
2007 ASAT test in the first place.
Such issues, however, serve to highlight the
importance of a careful study of the issue of
space deterrence, and to do so from more than
just an American perspective. The study by
the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense
Studies serves as an excellent starting point
for such an effort.
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Strengthening Deterrence: Assuring Delivery of Space Capabilities
Peter L. Hays

The Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies’ report on “Space Deterrence:
The Delicate Balance of Risk” briefly
overviews fundamental deterrence concepts
and evaluates how deterrence functioned
during the Cold War; it masterfully assesses
the most relevant and applicable lessons for
today’s space deterrence challenges. The
report
comprehensively
and
multidimensionally addresses space deterrence by
discussing key issues, including the
vulnerability gap the United Sates faces with
respect to space capabilities, the difficulty of
defense, problems with credibility of
retaliation in an asymmetric environment, and
weaknesses in space situational awareness
(SSA) and attribution. It also makes key
recommendations to develop internal red
lines, improve defenses, deploy in more
responsive and defensible modes, expand
military use of commercial constellations,
lower dependency on space, seize the political
initiative, and improve SSA. Together, the
assessment and recommendations provide a
very solid foundation for strengthening
deterrence and assuring delivery of space
capabilities that have become increasingly
important for modern military operations and
the global economy. In addition, there are
other areas that may warrant further emphasis,
discussion, and evaluation of how they could
also contribute to space deterrence, including
a fuller assessment and understanding of
The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the
author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Security Space Office, the Department of Defense,
nor any other agency of the United States Government.
Address correspondence to: Peter Hays, (703) 693-5330
(telephone), Peter.Hays.CTR@osd.mil (e-mail).

superpower space and deterrence issues,
development of a better shared understanding
of space deterrence issues within the U.S.
Government and with key allies and potential
adversaries, and exploration of ways to add
additional layers and dimensions to deterrence
by including more focus on humanity’s longer
term costs and benefits of spacepower, such as
debris mitigation and planetary defense.
The United States and Soviet Union devoted
considerable time and resources to
understanding one another, communicating
clearly, and developing robust mutual
deterrence. Yet as revealed by the opening of
Soviet archives at the end of the Cold War, the
superpowers often perceived things quite
differently and it is not clear they ever reached
shared understanding on key nuclear and
space issues. Important areas with an apparent
lack of shared understanding include the role
of strategic defenses, escalation thresholds,
and space as a sanctuary.
Consider, for example, that the Soviets
launched a still somewhat mysterious 90-ton
battle station in May 1987 that never reached
proper orbit, but might have changed the
strategic balance; and that their plans for war
in Europe called for widespread initial nuclear
strikes. This lack of shared understanding
should inspire caution both with respect to
U.S.-Russian relations and development of
robust deterrence with other states, such as
China. The United States needs to have
modest expectations about its ability to
develop robust deterrence, continuously
question its fundamental assumptions, and
work more explicitly on improving shared
perceptions and understanding.
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A related area requiring more emphasis and
attention has been revealed throughout the Air
Force Schriever War Game, and especially by
the Schriever V game completed in March
2009: the need for whole of government,
whole of nation, and the whole of coalition
approaches to deterrence. This calls for
developing and implementing effective
methods to use all government tools of power,
harnessing related efforts throughout the
nation, and finding ways to achieve better
unity of effort across coalitions.
But just as the United States and the Soviet
Union lacked shared understanding of some
foundational issues, there is not solid
understanding or shared perception of key
issues across the government, nation, and
coalition. This reduces options and weakens
deterrence, especially when more detailed and
nuanced
options
for
signaling
or
communicating commitment are desired. The
U.S. Government must not only work harder
internally to develop shared perceptions and
understanding, perhaps through use of “crisis
games” in addition to war games, but should
also consider the best ways to be more
proactive in opening peacetime dialogue with
key allies and potential adversaries since it is
it is very unlikely effective shared perceptions
can be developed in real time in the midst of a
crisis or conflict.
Finally, the United States and all spacefaring
actors must think more creatively about using
spacepower to transcend traditional and
emerging deterrence challenges. Parts of
deterrence can help to illuminate paths
towards and develop incentives to create a
better future. Space, perhaps more than any
other medium, is inherently linked to
humanity’s future and very survival. We need
to link these ideas together and better
articulate ways spacepower can light a path
towards genuinely cooperative approaches for

protecting the Earth and space environments
from debris and other threats, generating
wealth and harvesting energy in space, and
ultimately developing capabilities to improve
the odds for humanity’s survival by becoming
a multi-planetary species. Some progress has
been made, but there have also been setbacks,
such as the long-lived debris created by the
high-altitude Chinese anti-satellite weapon
test in January 2007. Keys to improving
progress in this area include changing
perceptions towards acceptance of the serious
nature of the shared threats humanity faces,
understanding that they require cooperative
solutions, and recognizing the potential
benefits through cooperation in harvesting
energy from space and generating wealth in
space.

Deter War, Not Attacks Against Space Systems
John B. Sheldon
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

The “Space Deterrence: The Delicate Balance
of Risk” study by the Eisenhower Center for
Space and Defense Studies has much merit to
it. First, to undertake the task at all is
praiseworthy given the enormity and
importance of the topic. Second, the study
contains many sensible points, ranging from
the uncertain nature of deterrence to measures
needed to physically protect space systems
that policy makers and students of strategy
would do well to note. But as noteworthy as
the Space Deterrence study is, there are two
wider points to consider that are not found in
its pages. The omission of these points are not
necessarily the fault of the authors of the
study, given the parameters set out by the
study’s sponsor, but they are worth pondering
nonetheless.
First, the aim of the study is perhaps overly
ambitious. There is no guarantee that
deterrence will work, but there are many
things a state can do to maximize its chances
of success in the deterrence mission.
Maximizing the chances of success, however,
is incredibly resource demanding, and not just
in terms of materiel and finances. For
example, in order to give deterrence a fair
chance of success, sustained, disciplined, and
focused political will is required. Such a
commodity is not always in abundance,
especially if politicians do not care about the
stakes or have convinced themselves that
deterrence does not require political support41
The School of Advanced Air and Space Studies is the United
States Air Force graduate school for airpower and space
power strategists. The opinions expressed in this commentary
are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, nor any
other agency of the United States Government. Address

Such a commitment of scarce resources is
only plausible if the political stakes are high
enough, and as a result it is doubtful if policy
makers are truly serious about deterring
attacks against space systems. Instead, such a
massive undertaking is best done in the
service of vital policy interests, such as
utilizing a state’s entire military capability (to
include space systems), diplomatic acumen,
and economic power in combination to deter
other states from attacking United States
territories and interests. Deterrence must be
considered holistically, not just in terms of
particular technologies.
Second, even if one were to accept the notion
that scarce resources be spent on deterring
attacks against one particular part of the U.S.
military’s vast capabilities, there is a woeful
lack of thinking in policy circles about the
very real prospect of deterrence failure. The
United States could devote massive resources
to space protection measures and invest a
great deal of political will to deter attacks
against space systems, yet all of this may well
come to nothing. Adversaries may still feel
that their best chance of success against
overwhelming U.S. military might is to attack
U.S. space systems despite efforts to deter
against such attacks. In the face of this kind of
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deterrence failure, what would the United
States do? One way to avoid such a scenario is
to strive for mission success without space
systems in all defense planning and exercises
– an effort that may have a deterrent value inand-of-itself.
Lastly, as worthy as the Space Deterrence
study is, one cannot help but hold the
suspicion that the powers that ultimately
approved the Space Deterrence study may
have been looking at deterrence as a cheap
way out of the thorny issue of space
protection. Naturally, this author would be
happy to be proven wrong about this
suspicion, but if there is but a sliver of truth to
the charge then policy makers should beware
the temptation of using deterrence as an
abrogation of strategic thinking. Space
protection is essential for the future well being
of U.S. space power and will not come cheap.

Air Force Space Command Perspective on Space Deterrence
Mike Manor and Kurt Neuman
United States Air Force Space Command

The Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies embarked on an ambitious
project when they tackled the subject of space
deterrence. The end result is a comprehensive
report that provides an excellent summary of
changes in the strategic space environment, as
well as a perceptive analytical framework for
assessing deterrence options. The layered
strategy – International Norms, Entanglement,
Retaliation, and Denial – is an original model
that nicely captures vital aspects of space
deterrence. Closing out the report are
recommendations that are practical and
cogent, offering clear steps for improving the
deterrent posture of the United States in space.
While one of the most complete studies on the
subject yet produced, there exist areas of this
complex discussion that are worth further
exploration and additional debate. Most
notably, the Eisenhower Center’s study does
not address actions relating to subnational and
nonstate actors and the tremendous impact
they could have on national security concerns
and economic well being. The study assumes
the list of potential actors with the motive and
capability to attack the U.S. in space is small,
and that the most likely scenario is a state
The United States Air Force established Air Force Space
Command in 1982 with space operations as its primary
mission, including command over space forces and nuclear
forces. In 2008, the Air Force decided to place Air Force
Cyber Command as a Numbered Air Force within Air Force
Space Command and to establish a new command for nuclear
forces – Global Strike Command. The opinions and
conclusions expressed in this commentary are those of the
authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Air Force
Space Command, the Air Force, the Department of Defense,
nor any other agency of the United States Government.
Address correspondence to: Kurt Neuman, (719) 554-9128
(telephone), kurt.neuman.ctr@peterson.af.mil (e-mail).

using space attacks as a precursor to greater
engagement in conflict. This approach clouds
a critical element of space deterrence: namely,
how do we deter the full spectrum of threats to
the capability and benefits provided by space,
not merely near-peer attacks on space systems
themselves?
Subnational and Nonstate Actors
Our experience in war gaming shows space to
be an attractive target for a wide range of
actors. Terrorists, corporations that may
pursue espionage and sabotage, and other
states at war with each other – there are many
possible scenarios where an adversary
damages U.S. assets that are not on the field of
battle. Effective space weapons can be
acquired with relative ease and low cost.
Subnational actors or individuals can build
global positioning system (GPS) and mobile
satellite communication jamming devices for
less than $7,500 from components on the open
market.42 The subsequent effect of low-cost
weaponry is vastly disproportionate as
compared to the potential to damage millions
of dollars of equipment and severely hamper
U.S. power projection capabilities.
The rise of piracy in other domains suggests
the likelihood that the same threat may affect
the space domain.43 Space piracy could take
the form of stealing satellite communication
42
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bandwidth or jamming a communications
signal with the potential to inflict heavy costs
on commercial providers; furthermore, just
like pirates at sea, space pirates could extort
ransoms from these companies to stop the
attacks. The proliferation of low-cost
technologies and the knowledge to use them in
a potentially harmful manner make space
piracy a real possibility.
In addition, attribution remains extremely
problematic and it is likely that subnational
actors would assume they could inflict
significant harm without verifiable detection.
In China, for example, the controversial Falun
Gong spiritual group successfully jammed
television broadcasts on multiple occasions,
with one outage lasting eight days. During this
time they were able to transmit propaganda
messages over the hijacked communications
satellite, including videos denouncing the
government. The source of the jamming was
never discovered.
The Eisenhower Center study also does not
consider the possibility of a subnational attack
on terrestrial-based space architecture. The
significant cost of building, maintaining, and
operating ground facilities often drives the
decision to centralize the operations of
multiple space systems into consolidated
centers. Although such decisions decrease
cost, they sacrifice survivability and increase
susceptibility to attack. Ground antennas are
often in remote locations, geographically
spread across the globe, and difficult to
secure. These factors make the ground
architecture a tempting target and the U.S.
must consider how it could deter an attack on
these assets.
Even the
could be
nonstate
extremist
disrupt

proposed strategy of entanglement
a high motivational factor for a
actor. In general, the goal of
groups, such as al Qaeda, is to
Western influence and harm

industrialized
states.
The
economic
interdependence of developed states may offer
an attractive target at a disproportionately low
cost.
The significance of such actions to U.S.
interests is that even a persistent harassment
campaign could have an impact to national
security and economic well-being. As is often
noted, over 80% of US military satellite
communications in theater is carried over
commercial satellites.44 U.S. banking and
transportation systems are heavily dependent
on GPS capabilities. Even something as
seemingly innocuous as a single individual on
a corporate sabotage campaign could result in
widespread national economic and global
impacts. When considering terrorists that may
attempt to systematically harm the U.S.
economy and national security, the
repercussions could be even greater.
The conventional wisdom is that most
nonstate actors cannot be deterred as they hold
little of value beyond extremist ideology.
However, some would argue that “irrational”
actors can be deterred with a holistic approach
considering all elements of national power. As
Lani Kass explains, “the lack of readily
apparent pressure points does not mean
nonstate actors are unable to weigh costs and
benefits, it simply means new pressure points
need to be discovered or developed.”45 Once
found, the appropriate capabilities coupled
with manifest intent must be applied, creating
perception in the minds of nonstate actors that
costs outweigh benefits – in classical
deterrence theory fashion.
44

World Demand for Commercial Satellite Communications
by the U.S. Government and Military Markets (Frost and
Sullivan, Research and Markets, April 2009). For this report
refer to: http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/998169
(accessed August 2009).
45
Lani Kass, “Rethinking Deterrence,” High Frontier 5: 2
(2009): 20, www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD090224-115.pdf (accessed August 2009).

Space and Defense, Summer 2009

Cooperation and Military Entanglement
The authors provide an outstanding discussion
of economic, technological, and physical
entanglement, but further examination can be
focused on “military entanglement.” The
Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) system
provides a real-world example. In return for a
percentage of the system’s bandwidth,
Australia provides funding for one additional
satellite. In this case, an attack on the U.S.
portion of WGS would equally be an attack on
Australia as well. It is not clear whether this
improves the deterrent posture of the U.S., but
the development and use of common satellite
communications standards, protocols, and
equipment will certainly make for a more
effective and ready coalition force, which, in
turn, contributes to the deterrent calculus.
Military entanglement and an effective
international governance mechanism could
also provide leverage to quell potential
conflict prior to escalation, communicate the
consequences of irresponsible behavior, and
demonstrate a credible threat of repercussion.
If sufficient international support was
garnered in a space-related coalition,
responses could be expanded to the extent of
cooperative global denial of access to space
services (international launch facilities,
industry and manufacturing capabilities,
global sensors, and space debris collision
analysis, etc.) and the multitude of benefits
space provides.
In addition to traditional engagement with our
allies, there may be deterrent value through
purposeful entanglement with those states
generally considered to be adversaries. For
example, sharing transponders on a
commercial communications satellite with
Iran or North Korea may deter those countries
from jamming attempts to avoid interference
with their own signal. Furthermore, the
pervasiveness of GPS equipment in foreign
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military systems is another example of
military entanglement, as other states may be
reluctant to jam signals that would degrade
their own capabilities. Providing assurances
for GPS signal availability to our friends and
allies will discourage the development of
competing
systems,
while
remaining
ambiguous
with
potential
adversaries
increases the U.S. space deterrence posture.
United States Industrial Base
Industrial base concerns are briefly mentioned
in the report; however, a more in-depth
examination of the relationship to deterrence
is beneficial. Currently, International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) limits the
exportation of sensitive satellite technology.46
While these provisions were intended to
protect U.S. technological advantage, they
have eroded U.S. competitiveness in foreign
markets and provided a catalyst for
development of foreign space manufacturing
capability.47
The U.S. must foster greater dependence on
domestic
manufactured
goods,
while
continuing to protect those “crown jewels” of
highly advanced technological innovation.
The need to strengthen the U.S. industrial base
is a common thread that runs through all four
layers of the study’s deterrence model. The
consolidation of the U.S. aerospace industry
resulted in fewer companies competing for
fewer contracts, and employing many less
engineers and scientists. Recent studies have
gone so far as to say that American defense
and aerospace companies are quickly
approaching a day when they can no longer
46

Congress (U.S. House) passed legislation (Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for 2010 and 2011) that would ease export
restrictions and provide the Obama Administration authority
to remove commercial satellites from the U.S. Munitions List.
The bill waits (as of August 2009) Senate consideration.
47
Thomas Young, et. al., Health of the U.S. Space Industrial
Base and the Impact of Export Controls (Center for Strategic
and International Studies, February 2008).
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deliver the kinds of combat systems needed by
the military.48

and the US would not be able to retaliate in a
similar manner.

Reduction in the number of space experts and
restrictions in export controls have also led to
difficulty in maintaining effective production
in the foundational parts and supply sectors of
the Aerospace/Defense industry. The secondtier and third-tier vendors have been
particularly affected, driving some sources of
critical parts to be manufactured overseas. 49
Numerous instances of substandard parts have
impacted delivery schedules, resulting in
higher program costs and delays. A weak
industrial base tends to discount perceptions
that the U.S. will have the ability to act
unilaterally in space in the future, leading to a
weak deterrent posture. Meanwhile, bolstering
the industrial base sends a clear signal that the
U.S. will be the long-term leader in
innovation, technology development, and
space expertise.

Instead, the U.S. must develop some form of
“counter-value” strategy for retaliation that
takes advantage of all instruments of national
power. The study only briefly mentions the
possibility of responding in terms of nonspace capabilities, when in fact a non-space
response would be the most probable starting
proposition. Michael Krepon presents an
excellent argument for conventional strikes in
retaliation to an attack on U.S. space
systems.50 The arguments for whole-ofgovernment responses tailored to each
adversary must move to the forefront of
thinking as they represent the most likely
scenario when confronting hostile actions in
space.

Counter-Value Strategy
In the future, it will be necessary to develop a
more holistic approach to space deterrence
that leverages the complete set of national
capabilities
economic, diplomatic, legal,
social, information, and conventional military
forces. Allowances must be made for
deterrence across a complete spectrum of
threats, from radical subnational actors to
nuclear armed states. A range of options is
needed, as solely an in-kind response to an
attack on U.S. space systems is unlikely to be
in our best interest. In the case of subnational
or nonstate adversaries, they would most
likely not have any space assets of their own
48

See the following: “The Unseen Cost: Industrial Base
Consequences of Defense Strategy Choices” (Aerospace
Industries Association, July 2009), http://www.aiaerospace.org/assets/report_industrial_base_consequences.pdf
(accessed August 2009).
49
Ibid.

Conclusion
The complexities of today’s world have
exposed the limitations of traditional
deterrence theory. The breakdown of bipolarity and the subsequent dispersion of
global power centers, to include the
resurgence of nonstate and subnational actors,
have multiplied both the objects and the
mechanisms of deterrence. While it is true that
the essence of deterrence has not changed – it
is still the product of capability, will, and
perception – the new multiplicity of variables
have rendered old strategies inadequate.51
Deterrence strategy is often more art than
science. In the case of space deterrence,
failure could have wide-ranging and highly
destructive effects. This relationship points to
50

Michael Krepon, Space Assurance or Space Dominance:
The Case Against Weaponizing Space (The Henry L. Stimson
Center, April 2003), http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=81
(accessed August 2009).
51
Lani Kass, “Rethinking Deterrence,” High Frontier 5: 2
(2009): 20.
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the importance of continued debate and indepth examination of the topic. The study and
work of the Eisenhower Center provide a solid
foundation for this debate and a strong
analytical framework for further analysis.
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An Alternative View on Space Deterrence
Dwight D. Rauhala and Jonty L. Kasku-Jackson
The authors of the “Space Deterrence” report
provide
thoughtful,
common
sense
recommendations to strengthen space
deterrence, and given the complexity of
deterrence, provide a “layered defense”
strategy. The first recommendation given was
to improve space situational awareness (SSA).
As the authors acknowledge, these
recommendations are not “cost constrained.”
Although this and other recommendations
bear consideration, one difficult task will be in
addressing potential costs. The next
recommendation is to develop internal red
lines, a system by which internal alerts
provide notifications to the “national
command authority.” (National Command
Authorities was a term that referred
collectively to the President of the United
States and the Secretary of Defense. The term
was discontinued in 2002.52 The singular
term, “national command authority,” was not
an officially accepted term, although often
(mis-) used since, individually, the President
was, and is more correctly referred to as the
President or Commander-in-Chief.). The third
Air Force Space Command established the National Security
Space Institute in 2004 to provide specialized space education
and training to military space professionals. The opinions and
conclusions expressed in this commentary are those of the
authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Air Force
Space Command, Department of Defense, nor any other
agency of the United States Government. Address
correspondence to: Dwight Rauhala (719) 593-8794x358
(telephone), dwight.rauhala.ctr@afspc.af.mil (e-mail), and
Jonty Kasku-Jackson (719) 593-8794x371 (telephone),
jonty.kasku-jackson.ctr@afspc.af.mil (e-mail).
52
Abizaid, John P., Director of the Joint Staff memorandum,
Use of the Term “National Command Authorities,” 11
January 2002. The term and its abbreviation, “National
Command Authorities” and “NCA” were subsequently
deleted from Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of
Military Terms.

recommendation refers to enhancing the
ability to defend against threats to the
capability that space systems provide; little
specificity is given. Given the proliferation of
jammers and other disruptive technologies and
efforts (e.g., cyber and so forth) this
recommendation needs to be further defined.
Next, the authors recommend deploying space
assets in “inherently more defensible modes.”
Fifth, the authors recommend “operational
responsiveness.” They largely discount the
efficacy of the Department of Defense’s
(DOD’s)
concept
of
“Operationally
Responsive Space,” as was defined by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense in his 2007
memorandum by that title and reported in the
DOD’s 2007 Report to the United States
Congress. 53 Sixth, “expand military use of the
commercial constellation” to complicate
targeting options by a potential adversary is
recommended. This is not without issue, since
one might argue that this also serves to
increase the risk that and potentially lower
the threshold by which a commercial system
will be targeted, which raises many
implications regarding commercial assets
becoming military targets. Seventh, “become
potentially less dependent on space” is
advanced. If a state can afford to better
proliferate capabilities among space and nonspace assets, this naturally complicates an
adversary’s attack plan; however, it does not
come without significant opportunity costs
53

Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Memorandum, Department of Defense Operationally
Responsive Space Memorandum, 9 July 2007. In this
memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense formally
defined Operationally Responsive Space. See Department of
Defense Operationally Responsive Space Report to Congress,
20 April 2007.
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and/or the willingness to expend resources on
alternate capabilities that may not be as well
suited as those that can be provided by space
assets.
In light of the recommendations considered
above, we suggest, that in order to examine
the validity of the recommendations,
definitions used need to be clarified to
adequately address the issues and aspects of
space deterrence. We also contend that the
assumptions on which the recommendations
are made may be flawed, and we provide
below alternative views to their assumptions
for further consideration and study.
Contested Space
The authors acknowledge that “contested
space” does not have a single, agreed upon
definition; we argue that to discuss contested
space, a definition must be given nonetheless.
Additionally, we assert that contested space is
much broader than overtly attacking part of
the space architecture or interrupting one’s
ability to exploit it. It must also extend to all
that comprises a state’s space enterprise the
laws and policies, the domestic and
international
industrial
environment,
diplomacy, and any other enterprise, activity,
or consideration that potentially enables or
jeopardizes the exploitation of space
activities.54 If one considers the basic
dictionary definition of “contest,” which is a
54

International industrial competition has eroded U.S.
predominance in space commerce and affects U.S. ability to
indigenously produce space hardware and software. The U.S.
dominance has been affected by a variety of factors, including
national regulatory laws that restrict exports, e.g.,
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),
technological progress in other states, and the desire in other
states to not depend on U.S. space technology. See the
following: Annual Capabilities Report to Congress (Office of
Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology &
Logistics
Industrial
Policy,
March
2009),
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/annual_ind_cap_rpt_to_congr
ess-2009.pdf (accessed August 2009).
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“struggle for superiority or victory, then we
further claim that space has been contested
since the immediate aftermath of World War
II, when the U.S .and Soviet Union began
their activities in space in earnest.55 Certainly,
these activities were exemplified by the 1957
launch of Sputnik followed closely by the U.S.
launch of Explorer I.56
As our own national space policies
acknowledge, the importance of the U.S.
commercial/industrial sector to long-term
national security cannot be overestimated.57 In
a broader sense, contested space ought to be
defined so as to include those activities that
challenge a state’s efforts to gain prominence,
influence, and potentially predominance in
space. Naturally, this would affect a state’s
elements of national power. As stated, we
believe a narrower view of contested space,
such as overt military efforts to disrupt or
damage a space asset in space, is far too
narrow a view. In encompassing a broader
view, one can better understand a given
geopolitical context for the activities in space
and attendant implications. Whereas direct
action against a space object provides one
basis for analyzing immediate effects, longer55

The definition of “contested” stated herein is from Merriam
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th edition, MerriamWebster Incorporated, 2003).
56
R. Cargill Hall, “The Evolution of U.S. National Security
Space Policy and its Legal Foundations in the 20th Century,”
Journal of Space Law 33 (2007): 6-9.
57
See U.S. National Space Policy, 31 August 2006, U.S.
Office of Science and Technology Policy Fact Sheet,
http://space.au.af.mil/histpol.htm (accessed August 2009).
President Bush authorized the most recent national space
policy on 31 August 2006. This policy established national
policy that governs the conduct of U.S. space activities. The
policy supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/NSC49/NSTC-8, National Space Policy, 14 September 1996.
Current U.S. President Obama has not as of yet (September
2009) issued a national space policy. The 2006 National
Space Policy states: “A robust science, technology, and
industrial base are critical for U.S. space capabilities.” It goes
on to say that commercial space capabilities are to be used to
the maximum extent, consistent with national security.

44

D. D. Rauhala and J. L. Kasku-Jackson/An Alternative View on Space Deterrence

term implications can better be assessed by
looking at the broader view.
Given the premise that space has been
contested since the birth of the space age,
following the Second World War, the
underlying reasons for U.S. and Soviet Union
efforts to gain access to space may have been
multifaceted – the initial efforts of the U.S. for
purposes of national security, and the Soviet
Union perhaps more focused on national
prestige. Although U.S. Presidential policies
addressed the right of freedom to use space
unimpeded and the Soviet Union’s somewhat,
but not complete, acquiescence to that fact,
both states developed and demonstrated a
variety of counterspace capabilities, to include
nuclear anti-satellite (ASAT) systems.58 Even
though neither has attacked the other’s space
assets with kinetic ASAT systems, we
maintain that the relationship between the two
superpowers was one of a restrained contested
nature.
Since that time, nearly 12 states have achieved
varying levels of space launch capabilities and
more than 30 states and entities have satellites
registered with the United Nations (UN).59
When one also takes a look at emerging small
satellite (smallsat) technologies, such as those
developed by Surrey Satellite Technology of
the United Kingdom (UK),60 cooperative
efforts among states, and commercially

available space capabilities, the number of
states exploiting space now and the near future
will continue to grow at a significant space.
With proliferated capabilities and access, the
interests in using and potentially denying
space capabilities also become more
proliferated. More insidiously, states will
continue to seek and develop counterspace
activities and methodologies for countering
space systems. Some of these methodologies
may be destructive, others not. As opposed to
the authors’ view, we contend that nonstate
entities will also seek ways to counter the
utility of U.S. and other states’ space
capabilities.
One also often overlooks the role of the
industrial sector when addressing contested
space. The U.S. industrial sector once
dominated this area, but no more.
International consortia and technologies have
proliferated. With greater international
competition, the space-related sector has
tended to become more consolidated with, in
the U.S. and European cases, fewer surviving
large “space” companies and a greater reliance
on imported components.61 This, combined
with countries’ policies that have enabled or
constrained their respective industrial sectors’
competitiveness will greatly affect the national
security not only now, but in the longer term
as well.
The United States is Not
Uniquely Reliant on Space
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R. Cargill Hall, “The Evolution of U.S. National Security
Space Policy and its Legal Foundations in the 20th Century,”
Journal of Space Law 33 (2007); and Laura Grego, “Short
History of U.S. and Soviet ASAT Programs” (Union of
Concerned Scientists, 1 April, 2003). For Grego’s article see:
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/asat_history.p
df (accessed August 2009).
59
See United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org (accessed August 2009). This
Office captures the states that have signed up to the
Registration Convention. The signatories to this Convention
agree to register their satellites at a time following their
launch and orbital insertion.
60
See http://www.sstl.co.uk (accessed August 2009).

Closely related to the definition of “contested
space” is the assertion by the authors that the
U.S. is “uniquely reliant” on space. According
to the dictionary, “unique” is defined as
61

See Annual Capabilities Report to Congress (Office of
Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology &
Logistics
Industrial
Policy,
March
2009),
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/annual_ind_cap_rpt_to_congr
ess-2009.pdf (accessed August 2009).
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“being the only one” or “being without a like
or equal.”62 While it is true that U.S. space
capabilities far surpass most states, it is not
true that the U.S. is the only state that uses
space capabilities – especially if one considers
those capabilities within the 20-year period
suggested by the Eisenhower Center study.
China currently conducts the same range of
activities in space as the U.S. with the
exception of space-based missile warning. 63
The European Union (EU) clearly indicates its
position of “strategic independence” regarding
critical space capabilities.64 Japan changed its
laws in 2007 to allow significantly increased
development and reliance on space
capabilities.65
Clearly the U.S., while more reliant on spacebased capabilities, is not uniquely reliant on
space capabilities. Also, as mentioned above,
one must remember that even though a
country may not possess an indigenous
capability to manufacture and/or launch its
own satellites, the commercial market allows
states to buy communication, remote sensing,
62

The definition of “unique” stated herein is from Merriam
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th edition, MerriamWebster Incorporated, 2003).
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See the following: Annual Report to Congress, Military
Power of the Peoples Republic of China (Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 2009), 25-28, located at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power
_Report_2009.pdf (accessed August 2009); and Larry
Wortzel and Dean Cheng, China’s Military Ambitions in
Space (George Marshall Institute, Washington D.C., 2006),
10-11. Both reports discuss China’s intent to increase both its
space capabilities and its reliance on those capabilities. The
Department of Defense report time frame is the next 20 years,
while the Wortzel and Cheng article addresses China’s current
5-year plan.
64
White Paper, Space: A new European frontier for an
expanding Union, An action plan for implementing the
European Space Policy (published by the European
Commission,
European
Communities,
2003),
http://galileo.khem.gov.hu/documents/angol/eus_dokumentu
mok/white_paper_on_european_space_policy.pdf (accessed
August 2009).
65
Hashimoto Nobuaki, Establishment of the Basic Space Law
– Japan Space Security Policy 123 (National Institute for
Defense Studies, July 2008.
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and navigation capabilities – essentially
allowing non-spacefaring states to rely on
space. Finally, we contend that typically,
space capabilities are currently merely a
means to gain information superiority in order
to conduct successful terrestrial operations.
Although the US is more reliant on space
capabilities for this information superiority
than others, it still retains non-space means of
attaining information superiority.
Irrationality
In order to fully enter into a discussion of
deterrence, irrationality must be defined –
since when attempting to deter a potential
adversary or competitor, one might better
approach a more effective deterrence strategy
if the target adversary is rational. That is not
to say that there is a valid deterministic theory
that can provide an “if, then” formula. The
authors state, “the history of strategic policy is
replete with examples of nominally rational
actors behaving irrationally.” If your
adversary responds to your action in an
unpredictable manner, is he/she acting in an
irrational manner?
We contend that it is not necessarily so. In his
book, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence
and a New Direction, Keith Payne makes a
distinction between an actor who is
unreasonable versus irrational. He also
illustrates that the adversary’s actions can be
very unpredictable despite the information one
might have of that adversary.66 One difficulty
is trying to think like the adversary. Even if
one can approximate such, one risks peril to
assume with any certainty that the adversary’s
actions are predictable. This can be further
complicated if the adversary intentionally
66

Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and
a New Direction (The University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 715. Payne goes on to assert how difficult it is to determine
how a potential adversary will react to deterrent attempts.
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seeks to mislead or deceive, a tenet that is
central to Chinese doctrine.67
Deterrence
The authors correctly point to the difficulty in
deterring a potential adversary; that “one size
does not fit all.” However, during their
discussion of deterrence, they state, “that
leaders feel impelled to proclaim red lines in
the first place may be taken as a sign of
ambiguity rather than resolve.” Does this
mean declarative statements are not needed?
What elements are needed for effective
deterrence? First, if one has any significant
prospect for deterring another, one must have
a capability to act. Next, the potential
adversary needs to believe one will act, should
that adversary behave in an unacceptable
manner. Third, the adversary must believe one
has the resolve. One complicating factor to
this deals with the stakes of the potential
belligerents.
We take a hypothetical situation to illustrate
this. Say, hypothetically, a crisis has arisen
between the People’s Republic of China and
the United States due to Taiwanese leadership
pushing for a constitutional change declaring
independence and total sovereignty. For the
Chinese Communist Party, this is seen as an
unequivocal red line. This is an issue that is
central to the Party’s legitimacy and long-term
existence. Do the stakes rise to the same level
for the United States and, almost as
importantly, do the Chinese believe that the
U.S. believes this critical to the existence of
the U.S., its people, and the government? If
there is a perceived mismatch between the
levels of importance the stakes take, there is
certainly a danger that deterrence efforts by
67

Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the Peoples
Republic of China (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009),
16-17.

the entity with lesser stakes might not be very
effective. Another complicating factor might
be historical precedent by the actors. Recently,
U.S. Administration leadership has stated that
a nuclear North Korea is unacceptable and
North Korea cannot be allowed to become a
nuclear power. How is future credibility
affected should North Korea fully realize its
aspirations, regardless of the rhetoric?
In somewhat of a contrast to the authors, we
contend “red lines” are critical. Without them,
the adversary might not understand the
deterrent message one is trying to convey. It is
true that how the red lines are communicated
is critical. During the 1991 Nuclear Posture
Review, the term “studied ambiguity”
surfaced. This meant that the United States
would not state when it would – or would not
– use nuclear weapons, but reserved the right
to consider any or all elements of military
power, should the need arise.68 One might
presume this also includes nuclear weaponry.
A red line does not need to be constraining.
Some argue Saddam Hussein misunderstood
the United States’ position when he decided to
invade Kuwait.69 Although it may not be
advisable in certain situations to tell a
potential adversary how one might act, it
could be argued that the adversary needs to
understand that one might effectively act and
that the elements discussed above have been
met.
68

NSPD-17/HSPD 4 [unclassified version]: National Strategy
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (President Bush,
December 2002). The unclassified version states: “The United
States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to
respond with overwhelming force – including potentially
nuclear weapons – to the use of [weapons of mass
destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and
friends and allies.” See the following for more information:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-17.html (accessed
August 2009).
69
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York Times, 19 September 1990.
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As we extend deterrence theory to space, it is
absolutely critical that any discussion of
deterrence addresses both the absolute and
relative reliance of each player on space. If the
U.S. were indeed as posited, “uniquely
reliant” on space, then there would be nothing
in space for the U.S. to hold at risk. The fact
that the U.S. is currently more reliant on space
than even its near-peer competitor China
complicates deterrence calculations enough.
Setting the stage and saying that only the U.S.
would be severely affected by the loss of its
space capabilities is alarmist, incorrect, and
does nothing to further useful discussions on
what could truly make deterrence in space
possible. Furthermore, such a position
continues to fail to address the necessity for
the U.S. to understand its adversary. Although
the authors discuss ensuring that U.S.
adversaries understand U.S. intent, they
completely disregard the equally important
requirement that the U.S. understand its
adversaries. In light of this ongoing U.S.
failure, clearly communicated red lines
become much more important.
One additional term needs to be clarified when
extending deterrence theory into space. While
we commend the Eisenhower Center for
creating an initial framework in which to
discuss deterrence in a space context, we
contend that key words are misused in such a
way to further muddle rather than clarify
issues. Of particular concern, is the word
“denial.” In the space control realm, denial is
part of the offensive space control mission
area.70 Although the authors use “deny” as
synonymous with “fighting through” an attack
on U.S. space capabilities, for any involved in
70

See Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations (Department
of the Army, Department of the Navy Marine Corps,
Department of the Navy, and Department of the Air Force,
United States of America, 6 January 2009), II-5,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf
(accessed August 2009).
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the space world that choice of words is
confusing and also politically charged.
Essentially the authors are speaking of an
adversary conducting an attack against U.S.
space capabilities that is ineffective, either due
to insufficient application of force against
those targets or because of redundancy in U.S.
space and non-space systems. No new
terminology is required for that discussion and
the use of “denial” actually impedes clarity.
Economic Entanglements
and International Norms
The Eisenhower Center study seeks to add
economic entanglements and international
norms as part of deterrence theory as it applies
to space. As noted above, deterrence is
defined as possession of a deterrence force
(military force) that can be applied externally
to an adversary to prevent an undesired action.
However, economic entanglements are
internally generated by states in the normal
course of actions, whereby the states enter into
an economic relationship in order to further
economic self-interest rather than to achieve a
deterrent objective. Additionally, economic
entanglements or relationships cannot be
imposed on an unwilling party. In regard to
international norms, international laws
regarding space have no real enforcement
mechanisms, and therefore there is no credible
threat of unacceptable counteraction via a
deterrent
force.
Although
economic
entanglements and international norms are not
part of classic deterrence theory, that is not to
say they are unimportant. On the contrary,
economic entanglements, in particular, may
prove to be a significant contributing factor in
preventing undesirable activities in space.
However, it is interesting that the Space
Deterrence report’s position on making
economic entanglements and international
norms part of a space deterrence theory are
similar to some Chinese authors who state: “It
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is not sufficient to solely use physical
counterattack mechanisms for deterrence in
space. Capabilities must be paired with a wise
strategy that includes important political and
economic elements. Utilizing the full range of
deterrent factors is the only way to maximize
security advantage, while minimizing the
possibility of conflict.”71
Declaring Space Assets “Sovereign”
is Impractical and Unnecessary
Although states exercise sovereignty over the
air space above their territories and the waters
adjacent to their territories, the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967 specifically states that space is
not subject to claims of sovereignty and that
space objects remain under “jurisdiction and
control” of the state.72 Sovereignty is generally
understood to be a state exercising supreme
power in and over its territory and over its
population.73 Jurisdiction and control include
the power of a state to legislate with respect to
its space objects. 74 Unlike some vessels and
aircraft, space objects are not considered to be
extensions of a state’s sovereignty. Although
the National Space Policy of 1996 stated,
“Purposeful interference with space systems
shall be viewed as an infringement on
sovereign rights,”75 the current National Space
Policy of 2006 states, “the United States will
view purposeful interference with its space
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systems an infringement on its rights.”76 The
U.S. has clearly moved away from declaring
its space objects sovereign at a time when
there is a growing perception that space is
contested and that some sort of undesirable
activity in space is more likely.
We contend the U.S. recognizes that
unilaterally declaring its space objects to be
sovereign is of no value. Although it is
theoretically possible to enter into agreements
to declare space objects to be an extension of a
state’s sovereignty, such an undertaking
would take a significant amount of time and
would not necessarily be of benefit. The
language of the 2006 National Space Policy is
likely to have been predicated on a number of
factors; one such being the specific language
of the Outer Space Treaty cited above.
Another factor was likely to be practicality.
The U.S. is able to meet its national security
objectives without having to declare its space
objects sovereign since it has jurisdiction and
control of those objects, and in any case has a
number of times refused to react militarily to
violations of its sovereignty when that course
of action best suited the situation.77 A third
factor may be political – declaring a space
object sovereign is extremely politically
sensitive compared to the benefit gained.
Additionally, if one extends application of
sovereignty to its logical conclusion, then a
number of other troublesome questions arise.
When space objects are sovereign, what
happens if they collide? Will space objects
have a buffer zone equivalent to territorial
76
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waters – and if so, how big? Is a physical
action against that sovereign space object
required for it to be considered a violation of
sovereignty? When weighed against these
issues it becomes clear that little, if any
benefit, will accrue to outweigh the difficulties
with first gaining consensus to declare space
objects sovereign, and second developing the
legal and monitoring regimes necessary to
make such a construct work. Declaring space
objects sovereign seems to us to be of little
benefit to increasing the efficacy of deterrence
and could be considered destabilizing as well.
Conclusion
We have tried to accomplish two things in this
commentary – (1) clarify the space deterrence
lexicon; and (2) amend the assumptions so
they can provide a realistic basis for
examining space deterrence. We believe that
once the assumptions are agreed upon, and the
definitions are clarified and widely accepted
the Eisenhower Center’s recommendations
can be further examined on the basis of their
merit.
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